技术与创新管理2024，Vol.45Issue(6)：668-680,13.DOI:10.14090/j.cnki.jscx.2024.0607
碳核查寻租的区块链治理随机演化博弈研究
A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Study on Blockchain Governance of Rent-Seeking in Carbon Verification
摘要
Abstract
The asymmetry of information inherent in the carbon verification system has led to rent-see-king behaviors,which not only infringe upon public interests but also severely impede the implementa-tion of China's greenhouse gas emission control plans.Therefore,it is imperative to effectively manage rent-seeking behaviors within the carbon verification process.To address this issue,this study constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model based on blockchain governance.Using Ito stochastic differential equations,it analyzes the stability conditions of the equilibrium strategies among the three main actors:the government,emission-regulating enterprises,and verification institutions.Additionally,it examines the effects of factors such as enterprise on-chain costs,government subsidies,government penalties,rent-seeking costs,and random disturbances on the strategic choices of these actors through numerical simulations.The findings indicate that blockchain technology helps reduce rent-seeking behaviors in carbon verification;that government incentives and penalties facilitate the construction of a blockchain-based carbon verification system,and the concealment costs generated by blockchain can effectively mitigate rent-seeking issues.This research enriches the theoretical framework for managing rent-seeking in carbon verification and offers practical policy recommendations for its effective governance.关键词
区块链/碳核查/寻租/演化博弈/政府行为Key words
blockchain/carbon verification/rent-seeking/evolutionary game/government behavior分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
刘晟华,江涛,覃琼霞..碳核查寻租的区块链治理随机演化博弈研究[J].技术与创新管理,2024,45(6):668-680,13.基金项目
浙江省自然科学基金项目"基于区块链技术的产品标准链创新机制研究"(LY21G020005) （LY21G020005）
