碳核查寻租的区块链治理随机演化博弈研究OACHSSCD

The asymmetry of information inherent in the carbon verification system has led to rent-see-king behaviors,which not only infringe upon public interests but also severely impede the implementa-tion of China's greenhouse gas emission control plans.Therefore,it is imperative to effectively manage rent-seeking behaviors within the carbon verification process.To address this issue,this study constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model based on blockchain governance.Using Ito stochastic differential equations,it analyzes the stability conditions of the equilibrium strategies among the three main actors:the government,emission-regulating enterprises,and verification institutions.Additionally,it examines the effects of factors such as enterprise on-chain costs,government subsidies,government penalties,rent-seeking costs,and random disturbances on the strategic choices of these actors through numerical simulations.The findings indicate that blockchain technology helps reduce rent-seeking behaviors in carbon verification;that government incentives and penalties facilitate the construction of a blockchain-based carbon verification system,and the concealment costs generated by blockchain can effectively mitigate rent-seeking issues.This research enriches the theoretical framework for managing rent-seeking in carbon verification and offers practical policy recommendations for its effective governance.