On Zero Dynamics and Controllable Cyber-Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems and Dynamic Coding Schemes as Their CountermeasuresOACSTPCDEI
On Zero Dynamics and Controllable Cyber-Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems and Dynamic Coding Schemes as Their Countermeasures
In this paper,we study stealthy cyber-attacks on actuators of cyber-physical systems(CPS),namely zero dynamics and controllable attacks.In particular,under certain assump-tions,we investigate and propose conditions under which one can execute zero dynamics and controllable attacks in the CPS.The above conditions are derived based on the Markov parameters of the CPS and elements of the system observability matrix.Conse-quently,in addition to outlining the number of required actua-tors to be attacked,these conditions provide one with the mini-mum system knowledge needed to perform zero dynamics and controllable cyber-attacks.As a countermeasure against the above stealthy cyber-attacks,we develop a dynamic coding scheme that increases the minimum number of the CPS required actuators to carry out zero dynamics and controllable cyber-attacks to its maximum possible value.It is shown that if at least one secure input channel exists,the proposed dynamic coding scheme can prevent adversaries from executing the zero dynam-ics and controllable attacks even if they have complete knowledge of the coding system.Finally,two illustrative numerical case stud-ies are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness and capabilities of our derived conditions and proposed methodologies.
Mahdi Taheri;Khashayar Khorasani;Nader Meskin
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Concordia University,Montreal,Quebec H3G 1M8,CanadaDepartment of Electrical Engineering,Qatar University,Doha 2713,Qatar
Controllable attackscyber-physical systems(CPS)dynamic codingzero dynamics attacksstealthy cyber-attacks
《自动化学报（英文版）》 2024 (011)
2191-2203 / 13
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support received from NATO under the Emerging Security Challenges Division program.K.Khorasani and N.Meskin would like to acknowledge the support received from NPRP(10-0105-17017)from the Qatar National Research Fund(a member of Qatar Foundation).K.Khorasani would also like to acknowledge the support received from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada(NSERC)and the Department of National Defence(DND)under the Discovery Grant and DND Supplemental Programs.This work was also supported in part by funding from the Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security(IDEaS)program from the Department of National Defence(DND).Any opinions and conclusions in this work are strictly those of the authors and do not reflect the views,positions,or policies of-and are not endorsed by-IDEaS,DND,or the Government of Canada.
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