电力现货市场中基于发电商竞价均衡情景的市场力缓解模型与方法OA北大核心CSTPCD
Generators Bidding Equilibria Scenario-based Market Power Mitigation Model and Method in Electricity Spot Market
随着市场化改革的不断深入,目前电力现货市场面临市场力滥用的风险.针对电力现货市场基于统一边际出清价格(marginal clearing price,MCP)的单边竞价机制,该文研究和设计一种市场力行为检测指数,并提出相应的缓解措施或机制,旨在有效遏制发电商市场力的行使.具体地,该文分析和证明基于统一MCP的单边竞价机制下发电商理性行使市场力的规律和条件,设计市场力行为(事后)检测指数;采用限制价格涨幅和考虑用电方福利最大化准则,提出两种可缓解发电商市场力行使的措施或方法;结合新能源市场化消纳发展趋势与政策要求,构建一种"同时报价、序贯出清"的联合竞价模型.算例分析验证所提方法的有效性及在未来电力现货市场中应用的合理性.
With the continuous advancement of market-oriented reforms,the current electricity spot market faces the risk of market power abuse.For a unilateral bidding mechanism based on a uniform marginal clearing price(MCP)commonly used in the electricity spot market,this paper designs a market power behavior indicator and proposes the corresponding mitigation methods and mechanisms,aiming to effectively mitigate the exercise of market power and promote the consumption of a high percentage of renewable energy.Specifically,we analyze and prove the general rules for exercising market power by rational generators under the uniform MCP-based unilateral bidding mechanism and design a market power behavior(ex-post)detection indicator.Using rate-limiting measures and criteria for maximizing the welfare of consumers,two measures and mechanisms that can mitigate the market power exercised by generators are proposed.Combined with the background of the market-based consumption of renewable energy,a"simultaneous bidding,sequential clearing"joint bidding model is established.The case analysis verifies the effectiveness of the proposed method and the rationality of its application in the future electricity spot market.
赵勇;胡斐;黄成;李远征
华中科技大学人工智能与自动化学院,湖北省 武汉市 430074国网江苏省电力公司电力科学研究院,江苏省 南京市 211103
动力与电气工程
电力现货市场市场力缓解措施边际出清价格竞价均衡
spot electricity marketmarket powermitigation measuremarginal clearing pricebidding equilibria
《中国电机工程学报》 2024 (0z1)
39-52 / 14
国家电网公司科技项目(1400-202099523A-0-0-00).Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation(1400-202099523A-0-0-00).
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