林业经济问题2024，Vol.44Issue(6)：607-616,10.DOI:10.16832/j.cnki.1005-9709.20240552
政府主导型国家储备林PPP运行模式演化博弈分析
An Evolutionary Game of PPP Operation Mode of Government-dominated National Reserve Forest
摘要
Abstract
⑴Background——China's national reserve forest construction has achieved remarkable comprehensive results,and has become an important strategic project in China,but its development faces financing difficulties,insufficient social capital investment and other problems.In order to solve these problems,Public-Private Part-nership(PPP)has become an important operation mode of China's national reserve forest construction.Howev-er,the PPP operation mode dominated by the government is faced with problems such as the increasing financial burden of the government and the lack of enthusiasm of social capital.How to promote the healthy operation of the PPP operationmodel is a practical problem worth exploring. ⑵ Methods——Based on the analysis of the significant characteristics of the PPP operation mode of the national reserve forest construction in Bijie,Guizhou Province,this paper put forward the basic hypotheses,and took the PPP operation mode of the national reserve forest construction in Bijie,Guizhou Province as an example to build an evolutionary game model involving the local governments,state-owned enterprises and agricultural co-operatives,and explore the internal mechanism of the tripartite cooperation under the domination of the govern-ments. ⑶ Results——First,the degree of importance and participation of the state-owned enterprises in the pro-ject is mainly related to the participation of the governments.When the superior governments participate in the project with strong reward and punishment mechanism and the local governments participate in the project with strong supervision,the state-owned enterprises are more inclined to actively participate in the projectconstruc-tion,and the agricultural cooperatives also have the motivation to participate.Second,when the rewards and punishments of the superior governmentsare less than the punishments of the state-owned enterprises for specula-tion,the probability of the local governments to choose to actively participate changes in the reverse direction of the initial willingness,and their enthusiasm decrease significantly.Only when the rewards and punishments are strong enough can the enthusiasm of the local governments be mobilized.Third,public budget expenditure is one of the main reference indicators for the local governments decision-making.Only when active participation in the project can alleviate financial pressure and save financial expenditure,the local governments will choose to par-ticipate actively.Fourth,the political pressure of the local governments and the interest replacement of the state-owned enterprises will make the state-owned enterprises tend to choose the strategy of active cooperation. ⑷Conclusions and Discussions——According to the above research conclusions and the practices of na-tional reserve forest construction,the following policy suggestions are put forward:First,strengthen the guidance and supervision of policies,improve the economic and social benefits of national reserve forest,and reduce the future financial budget expenditure of the local governments.Second,formulate the differentiated,diversified and multi-level reward and punishment mechanisms to improve the willingness of all parties to participate in the pro-ject construction.Third,improve the enthusiasm of the state-owned enterprises to participate in the projects.On one hand,the local governments should strengthen supervision and management,and improve technical,person-nel and financial support.On the other hand,guide the state-owned enterprises to raise their awareness of social responsibility,and promote the state-owned enterprises to participate in the construction of hometown forestry projects and the development of national forestry industry.关键词
政府主导型/国家储备林PPP/运行模式/演化博弈分析Key words
government-dominated/national reserve forest PPP/operation mode/evolutionary game analysis分类
经济学引用本文复制引用
凌仕全,胡超,董加云..政府主导型国家储备林PPP运行模式演化博弈分析[J].林业经济问题,2024,44(6):607-616,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72473067)、江苏省社会科学基金项目研究成果(24ZZB002) （72473067）
