考虑多重异质性的区域环境合作治理小世界网络演化博弈研究OA北大核心

At present,regional environmental problems arise constantly due to the negative externality of environmental pollution.Cooperative governance provides an effective solution to regional environmental problems.However,the division of administrative jurisdiction causes the local governments in different regions to act separately,prioritize local interests,and lack the motivation for cooperation.In addition,there are differences between various regions in the level of economic development,the objectives of governance,the willingness to cooperate,and the importance level of environmental governance,all of which increase the difficulty of cooperation in regional environmental governance.Therefore,it is essential to explore how to balance the interests of different regions,clarify the motivation and mechanism of the collaboration of local governments in environmental governance,and solve the dilemma of collective action.At present,there are still few studies applying complex networks to describe the relationship between local governments or giving consideration to the heterogeneity of preferences and incomes among local governments,as well as the resulting differences in cooperative contributions.Therefore,it is proposed in this study to construct an evolutionary game model of cooperative governance among local governments based on the weighted NW small world network. Based on the above analysis,this paper is structured as follows.In section one,an analysis is conducted on three major problems facing the practice of regional environmental governance due to the negative externalities of environmental pollution.Then,it is proposed that the governance relationship between local governments can be abstracted into a small world network.Besides,an analysis is conducted as to the heterogeneity of local governments and its impact on environmental governance behavior. In section two,the weighted NW small world network is applied to construct an evolutionary game model of cooperative governance among local governments.Despite the rational goals set by local governments,asymmetric information makes it difficult to choose the best strategy to maximize profits immediately.It is necessary to constantly improve the strategies through learning and imitation for more profits.Therefore,evolutionary game theory is adopted in this paper to describe the decision-making mechanism of local governments,with consideration given to the preference heterogeneity and income heterogeneity among local governments.In addition,the relationship between local governments in regional environmental cooperation governance is restricted by the external objective geographical location,rather than being completely coupled.Therefore,the NW small world network is used in this paper to describe the cooperative relationship among local governments,with weights introduced to describe the difference in cooperative contribution made by different local governments. In section three,the model is analyzed through numerical simulation.A MATLAB software system is applied to perform simulation to analyze the impact of cooperation income,cooperation cost,liquidated damages,and heterogeneity on the evolution of NW small world network.And simulations are conducted on the NW small world network with 400,900 and 1600 nodes respectively to ensure the robustness of the results.The results are as follows.Firstly,the increase of cooperation benefits and the decrease of cooperation costs can both promote the evolution of local government cooperative governance network towards Pareto Optimality.When the benefits and costs of cooperation reach a certain level,those regions with low levels of economic development are more sensitive to the changes in benefits and costs of cooperation.Secondly,an appropriate level of liquidated damages can promote the evolution of cooperation behavior for local governments.However,liquidated damages are limited to playing the role of guarantee and restriction.It is thus difficult to promote the full diffusion of cooperation strategies simply by increasing liquidated damages.Lastly,the heterogeneity of nodes has either positive or negative effect on increasing the level of local government cooperative governance.In case of low cooperative income,the proportion of cooperation in heterogeneous networks is higher in a stable state;conversely,the proportion of cooperation in heterogeneous networks is smaller. Finally,the conclusions are analyzed in depth and recommendations are made on the policy level in sections four and five. In summary,based on evolutionary game theory and complex network theory,this paper explores the game between local governments to identify those key factors in the emergence of cooperation on the network,and to solve the dilemma facing collective action in cooperative governance.These conclusions and recommendations can provide a reference for the governments to establish the mechanisms of regional environmental cooperation governance.