牡丹江师范学院学报（自然科学版）Issue(1)：1-7,7.
政府补贴下平台与商家联合公益博弈模型
Game Model of Joint Public Welfare Competition between Platform and Merchants under Government Subsidies
摘要
Abstract
This paper explores the optimal decisions of platforms and merchants in dual online and offline sales channels under the incentive of government-subsidized platforms.establishing a Stackelberg game model of non-co-operation between platforms and merchants under the conditions of government-subsidized platforms and platform-subsidized merchants this paper combines qualitative analysis with quantitative calculations to provide the govern-ment with optimal decision-making for subsidy strategies,and to provide platforms and merchants with the optimal theory for public marketing.关键词
政府补贴/Stackelberg博弈/公益营销/社会福利Key words
government subsidy/Stackelberg game/public welfare marketing/social welfare分类
数学引用本文复制引用
胡楠,陆媛媛,刘佳雨..政府补贴下平台与商家联合公益博弈模型[J].牡丹江师范学院学报（自然科学版）,2025,(1):1-7,7.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(71501082) （71501082）
