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基于非合作博弈的高耗能工业负荷参与调峰策略

姜婷玉 陶劲宇 王珂 鞠平 黄奇峰 段梅梅

电力系统自动化2025,Vol.49Issue(3):13-21,9.
电力系统自动化2025,Vol.49Issue(3):13-21,9.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20230806003

基于非合作博弈的高耗能工业负荷参与调峰策略

Non-cooperative Game Based Strategy for Energy-Intensive Industrial Load Participating in Peak-regulation Demand

姜婷玉 1陶劲宇 1王珂 1鞠平 1黄奇峰 2段梅梅2

作者信息

  • 1. 河海大学能源与电气学院,江苏省南京市 211100
  • 2. 国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心,江苏省南京市 210000
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Energy-intensive industrial loads have high power consumption,high automation levels,and strong controllability,which show great demand response(DR)potentials and can be regarded as an important means to deal with the continuous expansion of the peak-valley difference in the new power system.Therefore,the estimation of the response behaviors of the industrial loads and the formulation of the relevant strategies are helpful to fulfill their DR potentials.Firstly,the response characteristics of the energy-intensive industrial loads are analyzed,and the specific threshold judgment method for industrial loads participating in peak regulation is proposed.Secondly,the models are established to describe the response behaviors of the typical industrial loads and the decision-making behavior of the dispatching and control center,respectively.Thirdly,considering the rationality of the behaviors for peak-regulation market participants,a 1-N non-cooperative game model is established to describe the interaction behaviors between the peak-regulation market participants.Then,the impact of the different incentive modes on peak-regulation market participants is further discussed,and the corresponding solution algorithm is given.Finally,the case simulation analyses are conducted with an industrial park,and the results verify that the proposed strategy has significant peak-regulation effects,and all the peak-regulation market participants can obtain the optimal benefits.

关键词

新型电力系统/需求响应/调峰/工业负荷/非合作博弈/负荷建模

Key words

new power system/demand response/peak regulation/industrial load/non-cooperative game/load modeling

引用本文复制引用

姜婷玉,陶劲宇,王珂,鞠平,黄奇峰,段梅梅..基于非合作博弈的高耗能工业负荷参与调峰策略[J].电力系统自动化,2025,49(3):13-21,9.

基金项目

国家电网公司总部管理科技项目(5100-202218387A-2-0-ZN)资助. This work is supported by State Grid Corporation of China(No.5100-202218387A-2-0-ZN). (5100-202218387A-2-0-ZN)

电力系统自动化

OA北大核心

1000-1026

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