摘要
Abstract
Government procurement is an important economic activity for government departments,reflecting the public func-tions undertaken by the government.Centralized procurement is a representative form of government procurement activities.In re-cent years,China's system of government centralized procurement has developed rapidly.However,due to the presence of multi-level delegated agency relationships in government centralized procurement,rent-seeking and corruption phenomena still exist to a certain extent.This paper takes government centralized procurement as the research object,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving suppliers,procurement personnel,and government regulatory departments.It analyzes the stability of equilibrium points in this system and examines the impact of factors such as the market value of goods or services and rent-seeking costs on the evolutionary process and outcomes.Finally,using Matlab2023a for simulation analysis,the research results show that the delegated agency mechanism leads to conflicts of interest among various parties in government procurement,with potential risks of rent-seek-ing between suppliers and procurement personnel.Based on the research results,policy recommendations for optimizing the gov-ernment procurement mechanism are proposed,including enhancing the market value of goods or services,increasing rent-seeking costs,and strengthening penalties.关键词
政府集中采购/委托代理机制/三方演化博弈/仿真分析Key words
Government Centralized Procurement/Delegated Agency Mechanism/Tripartite Evolutionary Game/Simulation Analysis分类
管理科学
