摘要
Abstract
The premise of maintaining state-owned capital's control rights over state-owned enterprises(SOEs)is typical in current state-owned equity reform practice.Based on the premise,we summarize the typical path of state-owned equity reform practice into two major categories:transferring control rights while replacing the controlling shareholder or maintaining original control rights while introducing new investors.In this paper,we empirically examine the difference in the effects of different reform paths on the transfor-mation of SOEs'operating mechanisms.Based on the results of comparative analysis between SOEs with/without state-owned equity re-form experience,we find that from the perspective of reducing policy burdens and strengthening managerial incentives,replacing con-trolling shareholders plays no role in transforming operating mechanisms of SOEs,while introducing new investors plays a partial role and introducing new private investors plays a critical role in motivating the transformation of operating mechanisms.Finally,heteroge-neity analysis shows that the effect of introducing new investors,especially non-state investors,on transforming the operating mecha-nism is more significant in state-owned enterprises with a higher ownership concentration degree or lower ownership mix degree.In the context of the realistic demand of maintaining state-owned capitals'control rights and of the fundamental purpose of promoting the transformation of SOEs'operating mechanisms,we analyze different reform paths in the same analytical framework,and our research brings active thinking and beneficial inspiration for the selection of an appropriate reform path.关键词
国有股权改革/经营机制转换/替换控股股东/引入非控股股东Key words
state-owned equity reform/operating mechanism transformation/replacement of the controlling shareholder/introduction of new investors分类
管理科学
