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知识产权保护下政府碳配额分配方式与再制造模式选择演化博弈分析

夏西强 汪仲泽 王巍

系统管理学报2025,Vol.34Issue(2):412-427,16.
系统管理学报2025,Vol.34Issue(2):412-427,16.DOI:10.3969/j.issn2097-4558.2025.02.010

知识产权保护下政府碳配额分配方式与再制造模式选择演化博弈分析

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments'Carbon Allowance Allocation and Selection of Remanufacturing Modes Under Intellectual Property Protection

夏西强 1汪仲泽 2王巍1

作者信息

  • 1. 郑州大学 商学院,郑州 450001
  • 2. 北京航空航天大学 公共管理学院,北京 100191
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

This paper analyzes the allocation of carbon allowances by governments and the selection of remanufacturing modes by original equipment manufacturers(OEMs)within the context of intellectual property protection.It constructs a game model of manufacturing/remanufacturing and their evolutionary game models to analyze the stable strategy for the system.The findings indicate that when the government uses the grandfather method to allocate carbon allowances,it contributes to reducing environmental impact and achieving optimal environmental benefits.Similarly,when the OEM adopts the strategy of outsourcing remanufacturing,it can maximize profits.After the model evolution,the entire system stabilizes with the strategy combination{grandfather method,outsourcing remanufacturing},leading to a win-win outcome for both parties.In addition,if the government adopts the benchmarking method for enterprises with low carbon emissions,an increase in carbon trading prices would lower the prices of both new and remanufactured products,resulting in decreased sales of remanufactured products.However,when carbon trading prices under the benchmarking method exceed those under the grandfathering method,the environmental impact of outsourcing remanufacturing decreases.The increase in carbon trading prices,consumer preference for environmentally-friendly products,and the carbon emission reductions of remanufactured products would encourage both the government and the OEM pursue strategies that promote system stability.Furthermore,the greater the carbon emissions of new products,the recycling cost coefficient of waste product,and the carbon emission baseline,the more likely the government is to select the grandfathering approach.

关键词

知识产权保护/授权再制造/外包再制造/碳配额分配方式/演化博弈

Key words

intellectual property protection/authorized remanufacturing/outsourced remanufacturing/carbon allowance allocation methods/evolutionary games

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

夏西强,汪仲泽,王巍..知识产权保护下政府碳配额分配方式与再制造模式选择演化博弈分析[J].系统管理学报,2025,34(2):412-427,16.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金资助项目(72472142,72402217) (72472142,72402217)

河南省软科学项目(252400411193,252400411302) (252400411193,252400411302)

河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2023CJJ188) (2023CJJ188)

系统管理学报

OA北大核心

2097-4558

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