西北工程技术学报2025，Vol.24Issue(1)：68-79,12.
无标度网络博弈的可再生能源交易策略与演化
Trading Strategies for Renewable Energy and Evolution in Scale-Free Network Games
摘要
Abstract
In order to cope with climate change and energy crisis,and to achieve a low-carbon energy transition,China has implemented the renewable portfolio standard(RPS).However,the implementation of the RPS under different quota ratios is greatly affected by policy parameters.Therefore,an evolutionary game model of power generators and power sellers was constructed,and the game evolution was simulated using a scale-free network to reveal the impact of policy parameter changes on the strategy choices of both players under different quota ratios.The results show that when the quota is at a medium-low level,the reward and punishment mechanism has a positive impact on the participation of power generators and power sellers in renewable energy trading.Moreover,the lower the power generation cost and the higher the price,the faster the power generators evolve their share of renewable energy generation to 1.0.However,when the quota is high,a high reward and punishment mechanism is detrimental to the participation of both players in renewable energy trading,and the larger the penalty and the higher the feed-in tariff,the faster the power sellers exit from trading.Therefore,reasonable policy parameters and quota ratios are the key to ensuring the implementation of the renewable energy quota system.关键词
可再生能源配额制/演化博弈/无标度网络Key words
renewable portfolio standard/evolutionary game/scale-free network分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
冯彬,纳春宁,潘欢..无标度网络博弈的可再生能源交易策略与演化[J].西北工程技术学报,2025,24(1):68-79,12.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(62463026) （62463026）
宁夏自然科学基金项目(2023AAC03022) （2023AAC03022）
