中国卫生事业管理2025，Vol.42Issue(3)：241-249,327,10.
政府养老服务监管的演化动态:最有效机制的仿真研究
A Simulation Study of the Most Effective Mechanism on Evolutionary Dynamics of Government Supervision for Eld-erly Care Services
摘要
Abstract
Objective To study the interactive decision-making behavior and dynamic evolution law of government supervision of pension services and private capital investment behavior,and provide theoretical basis for the government to scientifically formulate reward and punishment policies and smoothly guide private capital to invest in pension care industry.Methods Based on four different reward and punishment policies,an evolutionary game model of government elderly care service supervision and private capital in-vestment behavior was constructed.And combined with experimental simulation by Matlab software,the existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS)and the possibility of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(MSNE)as the system ESS were discussed.Results Under the dynamic punishment and static subsidy policies,MSNE must be the system ESS as long as it exists,but under the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy policies,when MSNE exists and the punishment's upper limit is greater than the subsidy upper limit,MSNE is the system ESS.Conclusion It is optimal for the government to implement dynamic punishment and static subsidy policies,and focus on increasing the punishment intensity,which can not only guide private capital to invest in aging industries,but also reduce the higher requirements of ideal equilibrium for strict government supervision,thus avoiding high supervision costs.关键词
老龄产业/奖惩政策/民间资本/监管博弈Key words
pension industry/reward and punishment policies/private capital/regulatory game分类
医药卫生引用本文复制引用
谢虔,孙涛..政府养老服务监管的演化动态:最有效机制的仿真研究[J].中国卫生事业管理,2025,42(3):241-249,327,10.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目"长三角区域一体化发展中环境污染协同治理机制及支持政策研究"(19BJL035) （19BJL035）
2021年江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究立项课题"江苏深度老龄化背景下家庭养老功能重塑及支持体系研究"(2021SJA0705) （2021SJA0705）
