工业技术经济2025，Vol.44Issue(5)：150-160,11.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2025.05.016
碳欺骗视角下能源企业碳信息披露的信号博弈模型
Signaling Game Model of Energy Firms'Carbon Information Disclosure From the Perspective of Carbon Deception
摘要
Abstract
The technological choices of energy enterprises significantly impact socioeconomic development quality.However,fraudulent carbon information disclosure remains a concern in carbon emission trading.This study constructs a signaling game model to analyze the equilibrium strategy choices between government and energy enterprises,validating the equilibrium strategies through intuitive criteria.Through case studies,we conduct sensitivity analyses on policy penalties and subsidies to reveal the underlying mechanisms of equilibrium transitions.The findings indicate that moderate government subsidies can enhance the likelihood of com-pliant disclosure,while excessive subsidies paradoxically reduce government confidence in enterprises'compliance.Additionally,increased penalty intensity decreases sensitivity to changes in enterprises'probability of fraudulent disclosure.When the probability of fraud falls within the intermediate range,separating equilibrium induced by government fines may not necessarily be more condu-cive to achieving compliant carbon information disclosure compared to pooling equilibrium.Furthermore,when the probability of fraud exceeds a certain threshold,government subsidies lead to pooling equilibrium,demonstrating diminishing marginal effects of policy interventions.关键词
不同类型能源企业/碳排放权交易/碳信息披露/碳欺骗/新能源技术/不对称信息/政府规制/信号博弈Key words
different types of energy enterprises/carbon emission trading/carbon information disclosure/carbon decep-tion/new energy technology/government regulation/asymmetric information/signaling game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
郝道青,宋民雪,李德龙,冷杰,刘肖肖..碳欺骗视角下能源企业碳信息披露的信号博弈模型[J].工业技术经济,2025,44(5):150-160,11.基金项目
辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目"辽宁省制造业数字化转型的演化博弈分析及对策研究"(项目编号:L23CGL011) （项目编号:L23CGL011）
辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题"辽宁省制造业数字化转型演化机理及加快新质生产力形成对策研究"(项目编号:2025lslqnwzzkt-069). （项目编号:2025lslqnwzzkt-069）
