管理工程学报2025，Vol.39Issue(3)：87-103,17.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2025.03.007
信息搜寻行为对供应链CSR质量信号机制的影响
The impact of information search behavior on quality signal mechanism based on corporate social responsibility in supply chain
摘要
Abstract
This study's primary aim is to investigate the impact of consumers' information search behaviour on the quality signal mechanism based on Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)in supply chains.We consider a supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer,a downstream retailer,and final consumers,with information search preference,and build a signalling model of sharing upstream quality information by CSR behaviours.It is assumed that the product made by the manufacturer has two different quality levels:high and low.It is also assumed that the manufacturer privately owns the information on the quality level.Before sales,the retailer and a portion of the consumers(without information searching preference)cannot observe the true quality state,while the other consumers(with information searching preference)can foreknow the true quality state through their information searching behaviours.Under this quality information asymmetry,the manufacturer tries to disclose quality information by its observable CSR strategy with the retailer and consumers(here,it is not necessary for information-searching consumers to infer quality level via CSR strategy due to the foreknowledge of quality information),and the manufacturer and the retailer transact with a wholesale price contract.We characterise the pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium of the model completely,examine the feasibility of hiding or disclosing real quality information via CSR strategy,identify the applicability conditions,and describe the impact of information search behaviour on CSR signal behaviour and the performance of supply chain members. The sequence of the game model is as follows.Firstly,the supplier chooses a CSR level and a wholesale price according to its will to disclose quality information,i.e.,a zero CSR level means no sharing and a greater than zero CSR level means sharing.Then,after observing the CSR level to form Posterior Bayesian belief on quality(and then form the expected demand),the retailer determines its order and retail price.Finally,consumers determine whether to purchase according to their Posterior Bayesian belief on quality and the retail price.With this model,we focus mainly on the following three questions:1)Under what conditions can the manufacturer use a CSR signal to indirectly disclose quality information in the sense of a separating equilibrium?2)Under the condition of disclosing quality information,how does the proportion of information-searching consumers affect CSR signal level and the profitability of supply chain members?3)In terms of signalling efficiency,what is the lowest CSR level for manufacturers to disclose their product information?What is the impact of the proportion of information-searching consumers on the lowest CSR level? With the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE),we identify the feasibility and applicable conditions of disclosing or hiding real quality information via CSR strategy and characterise the impact of information search behaviour on CSR signal level and the performance of supply chain members.1)Manufacturers can hide quality types in the sense of a pooling PBE with the strategy of implementing no CSR behaviour if and only if there is no information search behaviour in the market;2)A set of moderate levels of CSR conduct signal the upstream supplier's high quality in the sense of separating PBEs.The PBE with the most efficient CSR behaviour is the only separating PBE satisfying the intuitive criterion;3)the CSR level with the most signal efficiency decreases with the proportion of information-searching consumers.The impact of information search behaviour on the equilibrium profit of the high-quality manufacturer depends on the information cost effect of upstream information disclosure via CSR.However,information search behaviour has no impact on the retailer's decision-making and profitability.On the one hand,these results reveal a quality-disclosing motivation of a firm's CSR strategy under the condition of consumers' information search behaviours;on the other hand,they also provide indirect mechanisms to realise quality information disclosure in addition to the existing direct methods.They provide supply chain managers with the implication of choosing a direct or an indirect way of disclosing information,conditional on the market's complex information structure.关键词
供应链/产品质量/信息搜寻/企业社会责任/信号博弈Key words
Supply chain/Product quality/Information searching/Corporate social responsibility/Signaling game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李余辉,徐炳姝,张榆芸,袁胜军,范建昌..信息搜寻行为对供应链CSR质量信号机制的影响[J].管理工程学报,2025,39(3):87-103,17.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(72002094) （72002094）
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(22XJA630003、21XJA630009) The National Natural Science Foundation of China(72002094) （22XJA630003、21XJA630009）
The MOE(Ministry of Education)Project of Humanities and Social Science of China(22XJA630003,21XJA630009) （Ministry of Education）
