农业经济问题Issue(4)：14-30,17.
中国合作金融组织剩余控制权模式:从"两权分离"到"两权匹配"
The Mode of Residual Control Rights in China's Cooperative Financial Organizations:From"Separation of Two Rights"to"Matching of Two Rights"
摘要
Abstract
It is challenging for Chinese cooperative financial organizations to concurrently establish incentives and constraints for major shareholders while safeguarding the interests of minority shareholde-rs.This is a critical factor to the current stagnation of cooperative financial organizations.There are two primary methods of allocating residual control in Chinese cooperative financial organizations:"separation of two rights"and"matching of two rights":(1)From the perspective of"separation of two rights",there are three models of cooperative financial organizations in China:homogeneous separation of pow-ers,imbalanced separation of powers,and sparse separation of powers.However,the cash flow rights in these three models do not accurately reflect the actual risk-taking willingness,ability,and contribution of major shareholders.This discrepancy exacerbates the conflict of interests between large and small shareholders.(2)From the perspective of"matching of two rights",this paper presents a summary of the model represented by SY Mutual Funds as a two-rights-matching residual control model.In contrast to the existing three models,this model incorporates the cash flow right of the major shareholder at each stage of the residual control right institutional arrangement through three mechanisms:an equity supple-mentation mechanism,a wind control balance mechanism,and an income refinement mechanism.This enables the cash flow right more closely align with the major shareholder's willingness to assume risks,capabilities,and contributions,while also addressing the inherent conflict of interest between major and minor shareholders.By undertaking a comparative and evaluative analysis of the two ideas and four models,this paper posits that the concept of"matching the two rights"and the model of residual control of matching the two rights represent a potential trajectory for the evolution of the institutional framework governing China's residual control of cooperative finance.In light of this,this paper proposes specific policy recommendations across three key domains,including the institutional foundation.关键词
合作金融组织/两权分离/两权匹配/剩余控制权/现金流权Key words
Cooperative financial organization/Separation of two rights/Match of two rights/Residual control rights/Cash flow rights引用本文复制引用
杨梦瑶,刘西川..中国合作金融组织剩余控制权模式:从"两权分离"到"两权匹配"[J].农业经济问题,2025,(4):14-30,17.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目"脱贫地区乡村振兴金融服务模式多元联结协同创新研究"(编号:22BGL066),华中农业大学高层次人才启动费项目"加快建设中国特色农业金融市场体系研究"(编号:108/11042010017),2023年度华中农业大学自主科技创新基金项目"持续推进脱贫地区乡村振兴的金融支持研究"(编号:2662023JGPY001). （编号:22BGL066）
