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考虑毛利保护合同影响的农产品制造商入侵决策

李萱 牛柏霖 孙丽丽 马骋

青岛大学学报(自然科学版)2025,Vol.38Issue(2):76-85,93,11.
青岛大学学报(自然科学版)2025,Vol.38Issue(2):76-85,93,11.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2025.02.12

考虑毛利保护合同影响的农产品制造商入侵决策

Encroachment Decision of Agricultural Product Manufacturer Considering the Effect of Profit Margin Guarantee Contract

李萱 1牛柏霖 1孙丽丽 2马骋1

作者信息

  • 1. 青岛大学商学院,青岛 266061
  • 2. 山东外贸职业学院教务处,青岛 266100
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The Stackelberg game theory was used to research the role and influence of the contract on agricultural product manufacturing enterprises and large retailers.By compa-ring different models,the optimal encroachment decision of the manufacturer was ana-lyzed.The results show that when the profit margin guarantee contract is not triggered,the lower commission rate makes the encroachment price lower than the retail price,and the demand increases accordingly.When the contract is in effect,the agricultural manu-facturer raises the encroachment price to compensate for lost profits.When the guaranteed profit rate provided by the manufacturer is in the medium range,the trigger of the profit margin guarantee contract enables the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve a win-win situation.Only when the commission rate of the e-commerce platform is lower,the manu-facturer needs to bear less encroachment cost,and the positive effect of contract triggering on the manufacturer is greater.Finally,regardless of whether there is a profit margin guarantee contract between the agricultural product manufacturer and the retailer,the manufacturer encroaches on the market through the platform due to the relief of the doub-le marginal effect.If,and only if,the profit margin rate is modest,the encroachment by the agricultural manufacturer can be a win-win for itself and the retailer.

关键词

农产品制造商/毛利保护合同/制造商入侵/代理销售

Key words

agricultural product manufacturer/profit margin guarantee contract/manufac-turer encroachment/agency selling

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

李萱,牛柏霖,孙丽丽,马骋..考虑毛利保护合同影响的农产品制造商入侵决策[J].青岛大学学报(自然科学版),2025,38(2):76-85,93,11.

基金项目

山东省自然科学基金(批准号:ZR2020MA024)资助. (批准号:ZR2020MA024)

青岛大学学报(自然科学版)

1006-1037

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