青岛大学学报（自然科学版）2025，Vol.38Issue(2)：86-93,8.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-1037.2025.02.13
特许经营中传递需求信息的服务监督策略
Service Monitoring Strategy for Signaling Demand Information in Franchising
摘要
Abstract
Based on the framework of the Bayesian persuasion model,the optimal signaling strategy of the franchisor under different circumstances when the decision power of service level used as a signal was studied.The results show that in the basic model,where the service cost is borne entirely by the franchisee independently,the franchisor's decision is clear,the franchisor definitely take(or relinquish)control over the service level.In the extended model,the franchisor needs to share costs with the franchisee when controlling the service level decision.At this point,subject to cost fluctuations,there exists ambigui-ty in the franchisor's decision-making,meaning there is a certain probability of choosing to take(or relinquish)control over the service level.关键词
特许经营/服务水平/贝叶斯劝说/信号Key words
franchising/service level/Bayesian persuasion/signaling分类
经济学引用本文复制引用
苑靖雪,郭永江..特许经营中传递需求信息的服务监督策略[J].青岛大学学报（自然科学版）,2025,38(2):86-93,8.基金项目
石家庄市科技计划项目(批准号:236240267A)资助. （批准号:236240267A）
