北京大学学报（医学版）2025，Vol.57Issue(3)：514-521,8.DOI:10.19723/j.issn.1671-167X.2025.03.015
突发公共卫生事件健康相关信息质量监管的三方博弈及仿真分析
Three-party game and simulation analysis of health-related information quality regu-lation in public health emergencies
摘要
Abstract
Objective:To construct a tripartite game model involving the government,the public,and the pharmaceutical industry alliance during public health emergencies,revealing the dynamic mechanisms of health-related information quality regulation and exploring effective strategies to optimize the informa-tion dissemination environment through reward-punishment mechanisms.Methods:Based on evolutionary game theory,a tripartite evolutionary game model was established,integrating strategy spaces,payoff functions,and parameter definitions for each stakeholder.The pharmaceutical industry alliance's strate-gies included publishing high-or low-quality information(α),the public's strategies encompassed ration-al analysis or passive response(β),and the government's strategies involved regulatory enforcement or inaction(γ).Key parameters,such as economic benefits(Iyy),regulatory costs(Czf),penalties(Fyy),and incentives(Pyy),were quantified to reflect real-world scenarios.Replicator dynamic equa-tions and Jacobian matrices were derived to analyze the stability of equilibrium points,while MATLAB 2016a simulations were conducted to validate the model under varying initial conditions(e.g.,Iyy=100,150,200;Pyy=0,20,35;Fyy=0,10,20).Sensitivity analyses examined the impact of critical pa-rameters on system evolution,by 50 iterative simulations to observe convergence patterns.Results:The study revealed three key findings:(1)Public rational discernment(β)significantly influenced the phar-maceutical industry's strategy.Simulations demonstrated that increasing Iqz(benefits of information acqui-sition)reduced Cqz(cognitive costs),elevating β from 0.4 to 0.8 and driving α(high-quality information probability)to stabilize at 1.(2)Government regulatory intensity(γ)correlated positively with the so-cial hazards of low-quality information.When Fyy+Pyy＞Iyy,speculative behaviors decreased,achieving equilibrium at α=1.(3)Dual stable equilibria emerged:a high-quality equilibrium(α=1,β=1,γ=0)with lower regulatory costs and a low-quality equilibrium(α=0,β=0,γ=1)associated with higher social risks.Phase diagrams illustrated path dependency,where initial α＜0.5 led to the low-quality equilibrium unless dynamic penalties(Fyy＞20)and incentives(Pyy＞30)were enforced.Conclusion:A"carrot-stick"collaborative governance framework is proposed,emphasizing categorized regulation,AI-enabled auditing,and dynamic penalty systems.Future research should integrate emotional utility func-tions to address irrational decision-making impacts,thereby enhancing the adaptability of health informa-tion regulatory systems.关键词
健康相关信息/质量监管/三方演化博弈Key words
Health-related information/Quality supervision/Three-party evolution game分类
预防医学引用本文复制引用
王宇,袁睿,李书鹏,常春..突发公共卫生事件健康相关信息质量监管的三方博弈及仿真分析[J].北京大学学报（医学版）,2025,57(3):514-521,8.基金项目
首都卫生发展科研专项(2024-1G-2013)Supported by Capital's Funds for Health Improvement and Research(2024-1G-2013) （2024-1G-2013）
