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虚拟电厂参与能量-调频市场竞价策略研究

吴玫蓉 李旭涛 白杨 尹亮 王放 宋宇航 丁永杰

宁夏电力Issue(3):13-21,9.
宁夏电力Issue(3):13-21,9.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-3643.2025.03.003

虚拟电厂参与能量-调频市场竞价策略研究

Research on bidding strategy of virtual power plants participating in energy-frequency regulation market

吴玫蓉 1李旭涛 1白杨 2尹亮 1王放 1宋宇航 3丁永杰3

作者信息

  • 1. 国网宁夏电力有限公司电力科学研究院,宁夏 银川 750011
  • 2. 国网宁夏综合能源服务有限公司,宁夏 银川 750011
  • 3. 国电南瑞南京控制系统有限公司,江苏 南京 211106
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

With the continuous advancement of China's carbon neutrality goal and the acceleration of energy transfor-mation,the importance of electric power market is increasing,which puts forward new challenges and opportunities for virtual power plant(VPP)to participate in the electric power market.Aiming at the problem of how to optimize the bid-ding strategy of VPP in energy-frequency regulation(FM)market to maximize the benefits,this paper presents a research method of the optimal bidding strategy of VPP in energy-FM market.Firstly,the paper introduces and analyzes the current electricity market mechanism.Secondly,based on Stackelberg game theory,a bi-level decision model of VPP participating in the power market and FM auxiliary service market is constructed.The upper layer model aims to maxi-mize the expected revenue of VPP,while the lower layer model aims to minimize the system clearing cost.Then,the two-layer model is simplified to a mixed integer linear programming problem by using KKT conditions.Finally,the rationality and validity of the proposed transaction decision model are verified by an example analysis.The example shows that VPP can get more profits in the market through strategic quotation.

关键词

虚拟电厂/能量-调频市场/双层决策模型/Stackelberg博弈

Key words

virtual power plant/energy-frequency regulation market/bi-level decision model/Stackelberg game theory

分类

动力与电气工程

引用本文复制引用

吴玫蓉,李旭涛,白杨,尹亮,王放,宋宇航,丁永杰..虚拟电厂参与能量-调频市场竞价策略研究[J].宁夏电力,2025,(3):13-21,9.

基金项目

国网宁夏电力有限公司科技项目(5229DK24000T) (5229DK24000T)

宁夏电力

1672-3643

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