管理工程学报2025，Vol.39Issue(4)：61-75,15.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2025.04.005
纳税信用监管与公司隧道效应
Taxpayer credit supervision and corporate tunneling effect
摘要
Abstract
Corporate tunneling involves controlling shareholders pursuing private interests at the expense of minority shareholders through related party transactions that transfer company profits into their own pockets.Tunneling stems from corporate governance's principal-agent structure defect,which could be reduced but difficult to eliminate.Tunneling commonly occurs in Europe and the United States despite their strong investor protections.However,tunneling is a serious issue in China.Effective tunneling governance benefits financial markets and upholds social justice.Most literature on tunneling focuses on formal and informal investor protection institutions influencing controlling shareholders' behavior,but few discuss the role of taxation.This paper examines the impact of China's tax integrity system on corporate tunneling.Specifically,it conducts a difference-in-differences estimation using the 2014 establishment of a big data-supported taxpayer credit supervision system as an exogenous variation source.Using 2010-2018 data on A-share non-financial companies,this paper investigates the effect and mechanisms of taxpayer credit supervision on tunneling. First,this paper theoretically discusses the impact of taxpayer credit supervision on corporate tunneling.Taxpayer credit supervision could curb tunneling by strengthening the external oversight role of the government and market on corporate governance.The taxpayer credit rating process imposes higher standards and timelier requirements on corporate records,financials,etc.,and optimizes tax inspection resource allocation.This system enhances arrangements incentivizing tax integrity and discouraging bad faith,improving tax collection and government oversight of corporate governance.Additionally,annually updated taxpayer credit ratings supply firm-level signals to the market.The government's quantitative evaluation of a company's tax integrity provides simple,incremental information to market players.This may affect analyst and report attention and analysis depth on the company,enhancing market oversight of corporate governance. Second,this paper empirically investigates the impacts through a difference-in-differences analysis of A-share listed non-financial companies.Companies less exposed to the 2014 taxpayer credit supervision system are the control group,while others are the treatment group.A sample covering 4 years before and after policy shocks was constructed for regression analysis.The empirical findings show taxpayer credit supervision significantly inhibits tunneling.On average,related party transactions decreased by 11.92 percent point relatively,exhibiting statistical and economic significance.The results are robust across tests like parallel trend tests,alternative measure sensitivity,multi-level fixed effects,IV regressions,PSM-DID,and placebo tests. Finally,this paper identifies taxpayer credit supervision's impact mechanisms.Specifically,using effective tax rate changes to measure government oversight strength,it finds taxpayer credit supervision increases effective tax rates.This implies the system enhances tax collection and the oversight of corporate governance by the government.Using analyst and report coverage and firm transparency to measure market oversight strength,results show the system improves external attention and internal transparency.This implies the system strengthens the oversight of corporate governance by the market.Tunneling is reduced by reinforcing oversight by both government and the market.Heterogeneity analysis shows taxpayer credit supervision's impact on tunneling is greater in regions with weaker tax collection and inspection capabilities and companies with poorer auditing.In summary,this paper shows taxpayer credit supervision initiated by the government using big data has an"unintended consequence"on tunneling.The findings indicate fully utilizing government-held tax and administrative big data improves not just government market regulation but could also enable a non-Western corporate governance approach.Mechanism identification and heterogeneity analysis suggest that government-led firm-level credit ratings can supplement market shortcomings.However,government-led ratings require market mechanisms to maximize effectiveness.Such ratings could serve as a"signal flare"improving market oversight efficiency and effectiveness.Regarding policy,this paper advocates a wider,more detailed application of taxpayer credit ratings to provide incremental information guiding internal and external oversight forces.关键词
纳税信用/税收征管/信号效应/关联交易Key words
Taxpayer credit rating/Taxation/Signal effect/Related party transaction分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
鲁建坤,吴成,蒲龙..纳税信用监管与公司隧道效应[J].管理工程学报,2025,39(4):61-75,15.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目(22BJY246) The National Social Science Foundation of China(22BJY246) （22BJY246）
