电力建设2025，Vol.46Issue(7)：53-66,14.DOI:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2025.07.005
基于CVaR的虚拟电厂与电动汽车主从博弈策略
Stackelberg Game Optimization Strategy of Virtual Power Plants and Electric Vehicles Based on Conditional Value-at-Risk
摘要
Abstract
[Objective]The large-scale integration of electric vehicles(EVs)presents potential flexibility and operational uncertainty in power systems.Virtual power plants(VPPs),as efficient paradigms for aggregating distributed energy resources,offer a feasible approach for coordinating EV participation in grid operations.This study proposed a bi-level optimization strategy based on a Stackelberg game to manage the interaction between VPPs and EV users under uncertainty.[Methods]A bi-level Stackelberg game model was developed in which the VPP acts as the leader and the EV users as followers.The upper-level model maximized the VPP profit while managing EV-related uncertainties via the conditional value at risk(CVaR).It sets risk-aware charging and discharging prices.The lower-level model minimized user costs by responding to these prices using a utility function that captures both cost satisfaction and charging experience.A particle swarm optimization algorithm was employed to solve the coupled model and identify the equilibrium strategies.[Results]A case study of a VPP system with wind,solar,storage,and 300 EVs demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed approach.Compared to benchmark strategies,the model reduced the peak-valley load gap by up to 36.9%,lowered the average user cost by 28.79%,and enhanced profit stability under uncertainty.[Conclusions]The CVaR-based bi-level game framework effectively balances the VPP profit,EV user satisfaction,and system stability.It provides a risk-aware,market-oriented approach for flexible resource management and offers practical insights into future EV-grid integration strategies.关键词
虚拟电厂(VPP)/电动汽车(EV)/主从博弈/条件风险价值(CVaR)/效用函数Key words
virtual power plant(VPP)/electric vehicle(EV)/Stackelberg game/conditional value at risk(CVaR)/utility function分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
马乾鑫,加鹤萍,郭宇辰,李培军,杨烨,刘敦楠,赵振宇..基于CVaR的虚拟电厂与电动汽车主从博弈策略[J].电力建设,2025,46(7):53-66,14.基金项目
国家电网有限公司科技项目(5400-202427221A-1-1-ZN) The work is supported by the Science and Technology Project of State Grid Corporation of China(No.5400-202427221A-1-1-ZN). （5400-202427221A-1-1-ZN）
