重庆理工大学学报2025，Vol.39Issue(18)：80-90,11.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-8425(s).2025.09.008
网络平台用工行为的三方演化博弈分析
Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of network platform employment behavior
摘要
Abstract
The employment of network platform is an important way of high quality employment under the new employment form,and the difficulty of guaranteeing the rights and interests of workers has become an important factor restricting its development.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of"platform enterprise,laborer and government"in the employment of the platform,and analyzes the evolution path and stabilization strategy of tripartite entities through model derivation and numerical simulation,in order to find out a long-term evolution path for online platform employment norms under new employment forms.Results show that the evolutionary strategies of platform enterprises,the evolutionary strategies of workers and the evolutionary strategies of the government interact each other.Platform companies needs to consider factors such as corporate benefits and costs,government punishment,and labor compensation when making strategic choices;as for laborers,they need to consider factors such as platform company costs and rights protection compensation;and the government needs to consider government benefits and costs,social reputation.In addition,in the long-term evolutionary game,the three parties can achieve an ideal mode of"platform enterprises self-discipline,workers do not protect their rights,and government strict supervision".关键词
网络平台用工/演化博弈/新就业形态/权益保障/高质量就业Key words
network platform employment/evolutionary game/new forms of employment/rights and interests protection/high quality employment分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
李攀艺,胡丹,曹奥臣,张红婷..网络平台用工行为的三方演化博弈分析[J].重庆理工大学学报,2025,39(18):80-90,11.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目"分享经济背景下模糊劳动关系治理机制创新研究"(17BGL150) （17BGL150）
