安徽工程大学学报2025，Vol.40Issue(4)：82-93,12.
自媒体与核心发声者策略互动行为的监管演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Strategic Interactive Behavior Between We Media and Core Voice
摘要
Abstract
The generalization and interactivity of we media have broken the barrier of information asymmetry,but the misuse of resources and strategic interaction between we media and core voice often lead to the crisis of public opinion in information dissemination ecosystem.Based on the dual attributes of core voice'information dissemination,the interactive effects of game subjects'behaviors,and the assumption of limited rationality,we construct the SD evolution game model with"core voice-self-media-government-public"as multiple subjects.Based on Lyapunov's first law,we analyze the stability of the possible equilibrium points in the system,and carry out a simulation study on the subject's decision-making behavior by adjusting the values of the parameters of the punishment strength,the regulatory cost,and the probability of complaint.The results show that:the strategic interaction of we media and core voice in influencing the public is the key to the growth of online public opinion,and the strategy choices of the game subjects are influenced by government regulation and public complaints;when the punishment of government regulation is higher than the value-added benefit of the strategic interaction of we media and core voice in influencing the public,the strategic interaction of we media and core voice can be suppressed;the timeliness of mainstream media's public opinion response and awareness of self-regulation are important factor affecting the game decision of we media and core voice.关键词
自媒体/核心发声者/策略互动行为监管/演化博弈/系统动力学Key words
we media/core voice/the regulation of strategic interaction/quadrilateral evolutionary game/system dynamic分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
候慧霞,谢荣见,蔡书凯..自媒体与核心发声者策略互动行为的监管演化博弈分析[J].安徽工程大学学报,2025,40(4):82-93,12.基金项目
国家自然科学基金项目(71904088) （71904088）
国家社会科学基金项目(20CRK005,16BGL201) （20CRK005,16BGL201）
