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碳价不对称下基于微分博弈的跨境供应链协调研究

张弘锴 李永飞

铁道运输与经济2025,Vol.47Issue(11):115-125,11.
铁道运输与经济2025,Vol.47Issue(11):115-125,11.DOI:10.16668/j.cnki.issn.1003-1421.2025.11.10

碳价不对称下基于微分博弈的跨境供应链协调研究

Coordination of Cross-Border Supply Chains Based on Differential Game under Carbon Price Asymmetry

张弘锴 1李永飞2

作者信息

  • 1. 广东理工学院 智能制造学院,广东 肇庆 526100||广东理工学院 肇庆市先进制造技术与装备重点实验室,广东 肇庆 526100
  • 2. 西安邮电大学 现代邮政学院,陕西 西安 710061
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism(CBAM)by the European Union intensifies the uncertainty and disruption risks of cross-border supply chains under asymmetric carbon prices.This study considered a cross-border supply chain composed of a manufacturer in a developing country,a retailer within the CBAM jurisdiction,and a third-party international freight forwarder.Based on a differential game model,it compared equilibrium strategies under decentralized and centralized decisions and introduced a bilateral cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination.The study finds that the manufacturer's emission reduction effort is proportional to the degree of carbon price asymmetry.A greater degree of carbon price asymmetry narrows the feasible range of cost-sharing ratios and may result in contract failure under extreme conditions.Within a moderate cost-sharing range,the contract enables reasonable cost allocation and mutual benefits.However,when the retailer's share of the manufacturer's emission reduction cost exceeds a threshold,maintaining coordination requires the retailer to avoid short-sighted behavior.This study provides theoretical support for supply chain coordination and emission reduction decisions under carbon price asymmetry.

关键词

碳价不对称/跨境供应链/契约协调/微分博弈/碳边境调节机制

Key words

Carbon Price Asymmetry/Cross-Border Supply Chain/Contract Coordination/Differential Game/Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

分类

交通运输

引用本文复制引用

张弘锴,李永飞..碳价不对称下基于微分博弈的跨境供应链协调研究[J].铁道运输与经济,2025,47(11):115-125,11.

基金项目

陕西省社会科学基金项目(2024R070) (2024R070)

铁道运输与经济

OA北大核心

1003-1421

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