摘要
Abstract
Obvious public good attributes and externality characteristics were available in animal disease prevention and control.The presentation of externality was different in brucellosis and African swine fever(ASF),leading to systematic differences in the objective,tools and incentive mechanism design of their control policies.Firstly,the design of policy institution was different:for brucellosis,the policy tool was an incentive-compatible mechanism,focusing on guidance,with the tool of zoning management including vaccination in the areas at high prevalence,and eradication in those at low prevalence;and for ASF,a mandatory constraint mechanism was used as a policy tool with the core of command and deterrence,and the tools of vehicle decontamination standardization,transportation registration,expediting compensation for stamping-out,closed-loop supervision towards the industrial chain,etc.Secondly,the direction of policy optimization was different:for brucellosis,improving positive externality incentives was oriented,including implementing market premiums of"free zone recognition",developing composite insurance covering"stamping-out+income loss"and increasing rewards for tracing human cases;and for ASF,improving negative externality constraints was positioned,such as implementing"subsidies based on disinfection efficacy",establishing an"interactive mechanism between biosafety disposal and insurance",etc.In conclusion,the above differences were essentially determined by the externality characteristics.Brucellosis control,as a"public health intervention",called for expanding positive externality via an incentive-compatible mechanism;in contrast,ASF control,being a"supply of industrial chain public safety",required mandatorily blocking the transmission of its strong negative externality.关键词
布鲁氏菌病/非洲猪瘟/外部性/激励相容机制/强制性约束机制Key words
brucellosis/ASF/externality/incentive-compatible mechanism/mandatory constraint mechanism分类
畜牧业
