中国人口·资源与环境2025，Vol.35Issue(8)：102-111,10.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20250316
基于Stackelberg博弈模型的大气跨界污染区域协作治理
Regional collaborative governance for transboundary air pollution based on Stackelberg game model
摘要
Abstract
Ecological compensation mechanisms have gradually evolved,in their development and application,into two major payment patterns:the"polluter pays"pattern and the"victim pays"pattern.Currently,most attempts regarding compensation for transboundary air pollution are based on the"polluter pays"pattern,with relatively little attention paid to the"victim pays"pattern.This study con-structs a Stackelberg game model based on these two payment patterns to analyze and compare their optimal strategies and governance effectiveness.It also designs a regional collaborative governance scheme for transboundary air pollution,providing a practical and feasi-ble implementation plan for its governance.The results indicate that:①Under the"polluter pays"pattern,the optimal strategy is solely related to the victim,and increasing governance investment can enhance governance efficiency and reduce pollution damage.In con-trast,under the"victim pays"pattern,the introduction of a contingent agreement results in the optimal strategy being influenced by both the polluter and the victim.②To better explain the real-world issue of asymmetry between input and benefit,this study also consid-ers the symmetry of compensation under the"victim pays"pattern.Regardless of whether compensation is symmetric or asymmetric,the polluter's optimal governance investment remains unchanged.The magnitude of the optimal target emission reduction in both sce-narios is influenced by the value of the compensation symmetry coefficient.③From the perspectives of economic benefits and overall benefits,a comparison between the two payment patterns reveals that the preferred pattern depends on parameter settings.Victims can select the optimal payment pattern by adjusting their technological level and emission reduction capabilities,thereby altering factors such as governance costs and efficiency.④Based on the existing theoretical logic and research framework,this study further designs a phased governance implementation plan encompassing four key stages:quantitative measurement,strategy selection,ecological moneti-zation,and payment determination,comprehensively presenting the complete process of collaborative governance for transboundary air pollution in real-world scenarios.For environmental policymakers,differentiated compensation payment patterns can be employed to drive transboundary pollution governance,while asymmetric compensation mechanisms can ensure the fairness and effectiveness of col-laborative governance.Additionally,more comprehensive information sharing and collaborative mechanisms can facilitate the imple-mentation of regional collaborative governance.关键词
大气跨界污染/污染者付费/受害者付费/Stackelberg博弈模型/补偿机制Key words
transboundary air pollution/"polluter pays"pattern/"victim pays"pattern/Stackelberg game model/compensation mech-anism分类
环境科学引用本文复制引用
刁贝娣,王玉龙..基于Stackelberg博弈模型的大气跨界污染区域协作治理[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2025,35(8):102-111,10.基金项目
国家自然科学基金青年项目"多时空尺度大气跨界污染的健康经济影响测度及补偿机制研究"(批准号:72104235) （批准号:72104235）
中国博士后基金面上项目"自然和经济双视角下大气跨界污染动态博弈与协作治理策略研究"(批准号:2024M753504). （批准号:2024M753504）
