重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）2025，Vol.25Issue(6)：54-68,15.
新机制下PPP项目提前终止风险演化博弈研究
Research on the Risk Evolution Game of PPP Project Early Termination under the New Mechanism
摘要
Abstract
Considering the relevant regulations of the new PPP mechanism in China,in order to avoid early termination of PPP projects,a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,social capital,and financing institutions in the risk management process of early termination of PPP projects is constructed to analyze the stability of equilibrium points in the game system.The results indicate that:under the new PPP mechanism,the equilibrium points to avoid early termination of projects are E(strong regulation,opportunism,support)and G(strong regulation,active cooperation,support);the game can be optimized by in-creasing the speculative cost of social capital C4,rewarding social capital with active cooperation S,reducing the value of social capital's active cooperation cost C3,and the net profit ΔR of social capital opportunism;finally,using MATLAB simulation to an-alyze the dynamic evolution process,relevant countermeasures and suggestions are proposed.关键词
PPP新机制/利益相关者/提前终止/演化博弈Key words
new PPP mechanism/stakeholder/termination/evolutionary game分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
YUAN Chen,BI Yanfeng..新机制下PPP项目提前终止风险演化博弈研究[J].重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）,2025,25(6):54-68,15.基金项目
国家社会科学基金一般项目"西部枢纽城市通道经济网络集成效应评价及提升研究"(22BJL069) （22BJL069）
