| 注册
首页|期刊导航|电力建设|支撑市场可持续发展的电力市场处罚理论和政策建议

支撑市场可持续发展的电力市场处罚理论和政策建议

ZHAO Jin DING Zhaohao ZHANG Xu JING Zhaoxia

电力建设2025,Vol.46Issue(12):1-9,9.
电力建设2025,Vol.46Issue(12):1-9,9.DOI:10.12204/j.issn.1000-7229.2025.12.001

支撑市场可持续发展的电力市场处罚理论和政策建议

Theories and Policy Recommendations for Penalty Mechanisms Supporting Sustainable Development in Electricity Markets

ZHAO Jin 1DING Zhaohao 2ZHANG Xu 2JING Zhaoxia3

作者信息

  • 1. Law School,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China
  • 2. State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources(North China Electric Power University),Beijing 102206,China
  • 3. School of Electric Power Engineering,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

[Objective]Ensuring the normal operation of the price mechanism and auxiliary mechanisms is an important goal for the future regulation of China's electricity market.Summarizing the regulatory practices of mature international electricity markets in dealing with behaviors that disrupt the price mechanism and auxiliary mechanisms,and comparing the penalty rules for violations in different countries,is of great significance for improving China's electricity market system.[Methods]Grounding its analysis in penal theory,this study conducts a focused investigation into the jurisprudential rationales and operational methodologies employed by EU and U.S.electricity market regulators to sanction manipulative practices.Through a comparative examination of statutory frameworks,regulatory philosophies,and empirical enforcement cases,the research systematically contrasts jurisdictional variations in both legal thresholds for liability and gradations of punitive severity.The concluding synthesis assesses enforcement efficacy to derive comparative insights into regulatory paradigm effectiveness.[Results]While Europe and the U.S.differ significantly in specific legal provisions governing penalties,their electricity regulators apply identical thresholds for initiating enforcement actions against market manipulation.While the U.S.model presents more efficient for quantifiable illegal gains,the French model provides clearer outcomes for uncertain gains.When no illegal gains or harm have yet occurred,the French model exerts stronger deterrence against non-compliant firms.[Conclusions]In light of China's evolving electricity market landscape,this article advances three policy recommendations:excluding the element of intention for violation determination;establishing a fine base with dual deterrence and compensation functions,coupled with fines graded by harm severity;education and penalties are combined to enhance regulatory effectiveness.

关键词

电力市场/市场操纵/市场监管/违规处罚

Key words

electricity market/market manipulation/market regulation/sanction for violation

分类

信息技术与安全科学

引用本文复制引用

ZHAO Jin,DING Zhaohao,ZHANG Xu,JING Zhaoxia..支撑市场可持续发展的电力市场处罚理论和政策建议[J].电力建设,2025,46(12):1-9,9.

基金项目

国家重点研发计划项目(2023YFE0119800) (2023YFE0119800)

国家自然科学基金项目(52277095) This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China(No.2023YFE0119800)and the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52277095). (52277095)

电力建设

OA北大核心

1000-7229

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文