摘要
Abstract
Given the government's push for digital transformation in hazardous chemicals road transport,this study develops and analyzes differential game models for three subsidy scenarios:no subsidy,ex-ante subsidy,and ex-post subsidy to hazmat transport enterprises.We investigate how different subsidy mechanisms influence enterprises'digital construction efforts and road transport safety,ultimately identifying the optimal subsidy strategy.Our findings indicate:(1)government subsidies can promote enterprises'digital transformation,but do not always guarantee enhanced road safety;ex-post subsidies specifically improve road safety only when digital efforts reach a certain threshold.(2)Enterprises exert the highest digital construction effort under cost sub-sidy,followed by ex-post subsidy,and least under no subsidy.Conversely,the government's digital construction effort is minimal under ex-post subsidy due to its focus on outcome verification,leading to relaxed oversight.(3)While ex-ante subsidy is identi-fied as the optimal resource allocation,governments may not always adopt it in practice.This research provides insights for shifting hazmat transport risk management from ex-post emergency response to ex-ante monitoring,regulation,and prevention.关键词
政府补贴/数字化建设/微分博弈/危化品道路运输/最优补贴方式/事前风险监测/安全监管/道路安全水平Key words
government subsidies/digitalization/differential game/hazardous chemicals road transport/the optimal sub-sidy method/pre-event risk monitoring/safety supervision/road safety level分类
管理科学
