| 注册
首页|期刊导航|林业经济|地方官员晋升激励是否影响碳排放?

地方官员晋升激励是否影响碳排放?

李振兴 程丽 李凤鸣 廖灵芝

林业经济2025,Vol.47Issue(5):34-50,17.
林业经济2025,Vol.47Issue(5):34-50,17.

地方官员晋升激励是否影响碳排放?

Does promotion incentives for local officials affect carbon emissions?

李振兴 1程丽 2李凤鸣 3廖灵芝1

作者信息

  • 1. 西南林业大学经济管理学院 昆明 650224
  • 2. 四川大学经济学院 成都 610044
  • 3. 四川省农业科学院农业信息与农村经济研究所 成都 610066
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Against the backdrop of China's"dual-carbon"goals and the cadre-evaluation"one-vote veto"system,this paper exploited the 2007 institutional shock that integrated environmental protection into promotion criteria and constructs a unified framework linking promotion incentives,fiscal revenue and CO₂ emission growth.Using panel data from 281 prefecture-level cities during 2006 to 2022,this study employed a two-way fixed effects model and interaction term mechanism test to systematically identify the inhibitory effect of local officials'promotion incentives on carbon emissions under Chinese-style fiscal decentralization,as well as its boundary conditions.The result showed that:Promotion incentives significantly reduced the annual growth rate of CO₂ emissions by 0.32-0.53 percentage points,with the strongest effect observed in the eastern region(-1.15).Fiscal revenue exerted a positive moderating effect,its interaction term reached-3.20 in the east,implying that abundant local fiscal capacity amplified the abatement effect of promotion incentives,whereas the moderation was insignificant in central and western regions.Robustness test remained consistent through provincial substitution,variable redefinition and heterogeneous grouping.The innovations of this study:First,it integrated promotion incentives,fiscal revenue and carbon emissions into a unified framework for the first time,revealing the moderating mechanism under fiscal constraints.Second,it employed a county-level carbon emission database based on nighttime light data to construct a prefecture-level city carbon emission growth rate indicator,thereby enhancing measurement accuracy.Policy implications include strengthening the"Party-Government shared responsibility"environmental oversight system,increasing targeted central transfers for ecological protection in central and western regions,incentivising green technological innovation through tax incentives,and adopting a multi-dimensional performance-evaluation system that incorporates economic quality,welfare and ecological outcomes to guide local officials toward green advancement.

关键词

官员晋升激励/碳排放/财政收入/经济增长

Key words

promotion incentives of officials/carbon emissions/fiscal revenue/economic growth

分类

资源环境

引用本文复制引用

李振兴,程丽,李凤鸣,廖灵芝..地方官员晋升激励是否影响碳排放?[J].林业经济,2025,47(5):34-50,17.

基金项目

云南省哲学社会科学基金一般项目"云南人口高质量发展的现实困境与实现路径研究"(YB202413). (YB202413)

林业经济

1673-338X

访问量0
|
下载量0
段落导航相关论文