中国国土资源经济2025，Vol.38Issue(12)：75-83,9.DOI:10.19676/j.cnki.1672-6995.001093
宅基地退出主体行为决策的演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Behavior Decision-Making of Homestead Withdrawal Subjects
摘要
Abstract
The interest disputes and behavioral games among various participants in the process of homestead withdrawal will affect the efficiency of homestead withdrawal.In order to explore the behavior and decision-making of multiple stakeholders under the principle-agent relationship and its impact on the homestead withdrawal,this paper constructs the tripartite evolutionary game model of farmers,local government and village collective,and uses Matlab to simulate and analyze the influencing factors.The results show that:the reward and punishment mechanism,coordination cost and self-interest preference are the key factors affecting whether the village collective can generate positive agency behavior and effectively avoid the negative results of homestead withdrawal;changes in factors such as withdrawal compensations,rewards and punishments have limited influence on local governments,while the accountability or subsidy of higher level governments is the key to affect behavior decision-making;the behavior decision-making of farmers depends on their measurement of the expected benefits of homestead withdrawal;the three parties mainly influence the homestead withdrawal through the path of"local governments—village collective—farmers",and their behavior decisions interact with each other,in which the village collective plays a key role.Based on these,it is suggested to improve the efficiency of homestead withdrawal by improving the distribution mechanism of rewards and punishments for village collective,improving the governance capacity of local governments,and establishing diversified withdrawal compensation schemes,etc.关键词
宅基地退出/委托代理/三方演化博弈/村集体Key words
homestead withdrawal/principle-agent/tripartite evolutionary game/village collective分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
翁羽奇,唐春燕,范胜龙..宅基地退出主体行为决策的演化博弈分析[J].中国国土资源经济,2025,38(12):75-83,9.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目"基于农户需求侧管理的宅基地使用权流转机制研究"(21BGL169) （21BGL169）
