工业工程2025，Vol.28Issue(6)：110-121,12.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.250109
资金约束下基于银行绿色金融的低碳供应链主体合谋行为研究
Collusion Behavior of Low Carbon Supply Chain Entities Based on Bank Green Finance under Financial Constraints
摘要
Abstract
To explore the collusion and loan fraud behavior of low-carbon supply chain enterprises with financial constraints in the context of green finance,a tripartite game model is constructed among banks,core enterprises,and small and medium-sized enterprises.The model identifies the key factors that drive collusion between core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises to defraud green loans from banks in low-carbon supply chains.Also,the impact of bank regulatory cost,regulatory success rates,and collusion penalty levels on enterprise collusion decisions and bank regulatory strategies is analyzed.Results show that the"operational ease"and"concealment"of collusion among enterprises,as well as the regulatory cost and penalty levels of banks,are key factors influencing collusion behavior in low-carbon supply chains.With the continuous increase in bank regulatory cost,its motivation and intensity are weakening,leading to a high probability of enterprise collusion.When the green lending rate of a bank is relatively high,that is,when its gap with the ordinary lending rate is small,the probability of collusion among enterprises increases.By investing in and deploying emerging technologies to enhance regulatory efficiency(i.e.,higher regulatory success rates)and by strengthening penalties for collusion,banks can effectively deter such behavior and reduce both the motivation and probability of collusion.关键词
资金约束/银行绿色金融/低碳供应链/合谋行为Key words
financial constraints/bank green finance/low-carbon supply chain/collusion分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
GUO Jinsen,YU Chunyan,ZHANG Yanping,ZHOU Yongwu..资金约束下基于银行绿色金融的低碳供应链主体合谋行为研究[J].工业工程,2025,28(6):110-121,12.基金项目
国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(23AGL006) （23AGL006）
