工业工程2025，Vol.28Issue(6)：137-148,12.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.250091
考虑政府补贴下基于金融科技的企业投资演化博弈
An Evolutionary Game Study of Enterprise Investment Based on Financial Technology under Government Subsidies
HE Huan 1LIN Yaofeng 2CAO Bin 2OU Zefeng2
作者信息
- 1. School of Management,Guangzhou University,Guangzhou 510006,China
- 2. School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Financial technology(FinTech),represented by blockchain,helps to overcome information asymmetry in traditional supply chain finance,so as to alleviate the financing difficulties faced by small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).However,enterprises often engage in free-riding behavior in FinTech investment,and how government subsidies guide such investment decisions remains insufficiently explored.To this end,an evolutionary game model between banks and financial companies under government subsidies is constructed.The model systematically analyzes additional ecological benefits from unit output effectiveness,investment cost,and technology investment,as well as the impact of free-riding behavior on enterprises' FinTech investment strategies.Results show that when the unit output effectiveness of FinTech investment is at a moderate level,the evolutionary equilibrium converges to two different stable states(i.e.,only the bank or only the financial company participates in investment).The additional ecological benefits of technology investment and the gains from free-riding behavior determine the specific investment decisions of enterprises.Moreover,both the levels and the asymmetry of government subsidies significantly influence enterprises' willingness to invest in FinTech:1)only when subsidies for both banks and financial companies reach relatively high levels will both parties jointly invest in FinTech;2)when both subsidy levels are low,the equilibrium still converges to unilateral investment;3)when subsidies are asymmetric,the party receiving lower subsidies tends not to invest,leading to a subsidy bias that suppresses investment by the disadvantaged party.Finally,free-riding profits substantially weaken investment incentives;effective stimulation of proactive investment can only be achieved when government subsidies offset the gap between investment cost and free-riding gains,or when technological protection reduces free-riding benefits.关键词
金融科技(FinTech)/投资策略/演化博弈/政府补贴/搭便车行为Key words
Fintech(Financial Technology)/investment strategy/evolutionary game/government subsidy/free-riding behaviour分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
HE Huan,LIN Yaofeng,CAO Bin,OU Zefeng..考虑政府补贴下基于金融科技的企业投资演化博弈[J].工业工程,2025,28(6):137-148,12.
