工业工程2025，Vol.28Issue(6)：149-158,171,11.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.250119
区块链农业帮扶中政府补贴机制与企业行为偏好
Government Subsidy Mechanisms and Enterprise Behavior Preferences in Blockchain-Based Agricultural Assistance
摘要
Abstract
This study investigates the alignment between government subsidy policies and enterprise behavior preferences in blockchain-based agricultural assistance.It aims to reveal the impact of different subsidy schemes on the decisions of self-interested and altruistic enterprises,thereby optimizing policy effectiveness and the sustainability of agricultural assistance.A tripartite Stackelberg game model involving the government,enterprises,and farmers is constructed to analyze equilibrium decisions under cost-based and sales-based subsidies across various scenarios.Sensitivity analysis and strategy comparisons are conducted to validate the results.Findings demonstrate that sales-based subsidies effectively incentivize self-interested enterprises to enhance traceability efforts,expand market scale,and significantly increase farmer income;in contrast,cost-based subsidies are more suitable for altruistic enterprises with high research and development costs,which can alleviate their financial pressure.Further analysis shows that when technology costs are low and consumer traceability preferences are high,sales-based subsidies achieve multi-win outcomes;otherwise,the system may fall into a"prisoner's dilemma".The study innovatively proposes a"policy-preference"matching mechanism,providing theoretical guidance and policy recommendations for designing targeted and differentiated blockchain-based agricultural subsidy policies.关键词
区块链技术/政府补贴/企业偏好/农业帮扶/农业数字化Key words
blockchain technology/government subsidies/enterprise behavior preferences/agricultural assistance/agricultural digitalization分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
GU Ling,NIE Jiajia..区块链农业帮扶中政府补贴机制与企业行为偏好[J].工业工程,2025,28(6):149-158,171,11.基金项目
国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71672153) （71672153）
