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官员晋升联动

吴延兵

经济学报2025,Vol.12Issue(4):50-68,19.
经济学报2025,Vol.12Issue(4):50-68,19.

官员晋升联动

Co-promotion between Higher-and Lower-level Government Leaders in China

吴延兵1

作者信息

  • 1. 中国社会科学院经济研究所||中国社会科学院大学经济学院
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Based on the theory of identity,the paper puts forward the hypothesis of co-promotion between higher-and lower-level government leaders and tests this hypothesis by using the data of prefectural party secretaries and county leaders(county party secretaries and county heads)in Jiangsu province in the period 1983-2020.Employing the difference-in-differences empirical strategy,the results show that in the first and second year after prefectural party secretaries are promoted to important administrative positions in provinces or central ministries,the probability of promotion for county leaders increases significantly.Mechanism analysis shows that with the promotion of prefectural party secretaries,county leaders who used to work together with them have higher probability of promotion,indicating that social network built on actual contacts is the driving force of the co-promotion between higher-and lower-level government leaders.

关键词

官员晋升联动/任命制/身份认同/社会关系/经济增长业绩

分类

社会科学

引用本文复制引用

吴延兵..官员晋升联动[J].经济学报,2025,12(4):50-68,19.

经济学报

2095-7254

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