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利益相关者参与内蒙古草原生态管理行动的四方演化博弈

李雪敏 潘越明 武振国

生态学报2026,Vol.46Issue(1):139-155,17.
生态学报2026,Vol.46Issue(1):139-155,17.DOI:10.20103/j.stxb.202504271008

利益相关者参与内蒙古草原生态管理行动的四方演化博弈

The four-party evolutionary game analysis of stakeholder participation in grassland ecological management in Inner Mongolia

李雪敏 1潘越明 1武振国2

作者信息

  • 1. 内蒙古财经大学财政税务学院,呼和浩特 010070
  • 2. 内蒙古自治区社会科学院,呼和浩特 010010
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The efficient implementation of grassland ecological management fundamentally depended on the collaborative interactions among stakeholders,which were essential for maintaining ecological balance and safeguarding local community welfare.Employing a benefit-cost driven analytical framework that incorporated government ecological compensation policies and reward-penalty mechanisms,this study established a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving superior governments,subordinate governments,enterprises,and herders.The research subsequently deduced the evolutionary trends of stable strategies for different agents.Through simulation analysis utilizing empirical data from the Inner Mongolia grassland ecosystem,the study identified optimal pathways for stakeholder collaboration in advancing grassland ecological management.The results showed that:① Stakeholders' strategy choices exhibited dynamic coupling and coordinated evolution.Under the synergistic effect of differentiated ecological compensation and reward-penalty mechanisms,the probability of the superior government choosing a strong supervision strategy declined gradually over time.Conversely,the probabilities of subordinate governments,enterprises,and herders selecting adaptive management,complete governance,and collaborative participation strategies,respectively,increased steadily across iterative periods.Ultimately,the game system evolved into an equilibrium state of"weak regulation/adaptive management/complete governance/cooperative participation."②Increased ecological compensation amounts and reward intensities exerted significantly positive incentive effects on subordinate governments' adoption of adaptive management strategies.The superior government needed to prioritize incentive mechanisms for subordinate governments to enhance their proactivity and scientific rigor in grassland ecological management.③ Enhanced ecological compensation and reward-penalty intensity significantly promoted enterprises' adoption of complete governance strategies but generated inhibitory effects on herders' collaborative participation.Consequently,subordinate governments required tailored compensation and reward-penalty mechanisms that accounted for different agents' behavioral characteristics,thereby stimulating enterprises' governance motivation while maintaining herders' cooperation willingness.These findings clarified the operational mechanisms of multi-stakeholder collaboration in grassland ecological management and provided a scientific basis for achieving sustainable grassland ecosystem development.

关键词

草原生态管理/利益相关者/演化博弈/仿真模拟/内蒙古

Key words

grassland ecological management/stakeholder/evolutionary game theory/simulation modeling/Inner Mongolia

引用本文复制引用

李雪敏,潘越明,武振国..利益相关者参与内蒙古草原生态管理行动的四方演化博弈[J].生态学报,2026,46(1):139-155,17.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金项目(42461045) (42461045)

教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(24YJCZH152) (24YJCZH152)

内蒙古自然科学基金杰出青年项目(2025JQ025) (2025JQ025)

内蒙古教育厅一流学科科研专项项目(YLXKZX-NCD-015) (YLXKZX-NCD-015)

生态学报

1000-0933

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