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需求改善投资下制造商入侵与平台信息分享

段仁吉 官振中 任建标

系统管理学报2026,Vol.35Issue(1):28-44,17.
系统管理学报2026,Vol.35Issue(1):28-44,17.DOI:10.3969/j.issn2097-4558.2026.01.003

需求改善投资下制造商入侵与平台信息分享

Manufacturer Encroachment and Platform Information Sharing Under Demand-Enhancing Investment

段仁吉 1官振中 1任建标2

作者信息

  • 1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院,成都 610031||"服务科学与创新"四川省重点实验室,成都 610031
  • 2. 上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院,上海 200030
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Based on a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform,this paper examines the interaction mechanisms between manufacturer encroachment and platform demand information sharing in the context of demand-enhancing investments undertaken by the manufacturer.Based on whether the manufacturer pays a commission to the platform to open an agency channel and enter the platform(i.e.,encroachment)and whether the platform shares demand information with the manufacturer,it develops four incomplete-information dynamic game models.The findings reveal that when investment efficiency is either high or low,manufacturer encroachment has no significant effect on platform information sharing.However,when investment efficiency is at a moderate level,sharing becomes complementary:manufacturer encroachment promotes platform information sharing,and platform information sharing further enhances the manufacturer's incentive to encroach.When investment efficiency is moderately high,increasing the commission rate leads to the equilibrium strategy profile to transition along the path of"encroach+non sharing→encroach+sharing→non encroach+non sharing".During this transition,the manufacturer's(platform's)profit exhibits upward(downward)jumps and shows a non-monotonic relationship with the commission rate.Additionally,when the commission rate is low and investment efficiency is high,encroachment increases the wholesale prices in the resale channel,a result that differs from previous literature.

关键词

需求信息分享/制造商入侵/需求改善投资/电商平台/渠道选择

Key words

demand information sharing/manufacturer encroachment/demand-enhancing investment/e-commerce platform/channel selection

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

段仁吉,官振中,任建标..需求改善投资下制造商入侵与平台信息分享[J].系统管理学报,2026,35(1):28-44,17.

基金项目

国家社会科学基金重大项目(23&ZD138) (23&ZD138)

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572154) (71572154)

"服务科学与创新"四川省重点实验室资助(KL2306) (KL2306)

系统管理学报

2097-4558

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