华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）Issue(1)：154-165,12.DOI:10.13300/j.cnki.hnwkxb.2026.01.014
压力与借力:双重委托代理框架下村干部的创新性政策执行
Pressure and Leverage:Village Cadres'Innovative Policy Imple-mentation under Dual Principal-Agent Framework
摘要
Abstract
As the street-level bureaucrats at the lowest tier of the national governance system,vil-lage cadres are confronted with pressures arising from imbalances between authority and responsibility as well as constraints in resource endowments.Investigating the theoretical and practical logic underlying their strategic innovations within structural constraints constitutes a pivotal inquiry in grassroots gover-nance studies.Drawing on a combined"structure-agency"analytical approach,this study constructs a dual principal-agent framework for village cadres and conducts a comparative analysis of the implementa-tion of common prosperity policies in three administrative villages in Town L.It investigates the behav-ioral motivations and strategic choices of street-level bureaucrats in achieving innovative policy imple-mentation.The research finds that village cadres,as street-level bureaucrats,are situated within dual principal-agent relationships between the state and society.Through the"Pressure-Leverage"mecha-nism,they cultivate motivations for innovation under dual pressures and build action networks by lever-aging resources from both directions.Village cadres promote the transformation of"pressure"into"le-verage"through interactions with township governments and villagers.They select appropriate response strategies based on the interest-based bargaining,and their innovative behaviors follow the action logic of equilibrium game.The study analyzes the process by which village cadres engage in strategic decision-making by utilizing the space created by the dual principal-agent structure,which is conducive to deepen-ing the academic understanding of the principal-agent theory and the policy implementation of street-level bureaucrats within the community settings.关键词
双重委托代理/街头官僚/村干部/政策执行/创新性执行Key words
dual principal-agent/street-level bureaucracy/village cadres/policy implementation/innovative implementation分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
崔向洁,张天舒,郭祥琪..压力与借力:双重委托代理框架下村干部的创新性政策执行[J].华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）,2026,(1):154-165,12.基金项目
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"全面建成小康社会伟大历史性成就与经验研究"(21JZD014) （21JZD014）
山东省社会科学规划研究项目"中国共产党调查研究制度建设研究"(23CDJJ05). （23CDJJ05）
