中国电力2026，Vol.59Issue(2)：24-36,13.DOI:10.11930/j.issn.1004-9649.202503035
基于三方Stackelberg博弈的区域制冷需求响应策略
District cooling demand response strategy based on tripartite Stackelberg game
摘要
Abstract
To address such issues as low user participation and coarse incentive strategies in demand response of air-conditioning loads in commercial complexes,a dynamic pricing model integrating tripartite Stackelberg game and deep learning is proposed.Firstly,a three-level hierarchical decision frame-work of power grid-aggregator-user is designed,and a neural network is used to mine the nonlinear function of user load reduction and incentive electricity price.Secondly,an aggre-gator profit-risk equilibrium model is constructed,and a penalty mechanism and power grid cost function under the elastic constraint of compliance rate are introduced.And then,the optimal subsidy price and load reduction are identified to optimize the subsidy strategy of power grid demand response.Finally,taking a commercial complex as an empirical case,the results show that the proposed model achieved a 94.2%load reduction compliance rate,reduced the user comfort deviation to 0.86,and optimized the peak-shaving cost of the power grid by 57.14%respectively.This study provides a decision-making tool that integrates game-theoretic equilibrium and behavioral interpretability for demand response in energy-intensive buildings,facilitating coordinated resource regulation in new-type power systems.关键词
区域制冷系统/三方博弈/需求响应/纳什均衡/电力市场Key words
district cooling system/tripartite game/demand response/nash equilibrium/electricity market引用本文复制引用
余君一,廖思阳,柯德平..基于三方Stackelberg博弈的区域制冷需求响应策略[J].中国电力,2026,59(2):24-36,13.基金项目
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52477119). 国家自然科学基金资助项目(52477119). （No.52477119）
