情报杂志2026，Vol.45Issue(4)：20-28,48,10.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-1965.2026.04.004
基于古巴导弹危机的模糊信号博弈研究
An Ambiguous Signaling Game Study of the Cuban Missile Crisis
单清宇1
作者信息
- 1. 同济大学政治与国际关系学院 上海 200092
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
[Purpose]Ambiguous signals refer to equivocal signals that international actors consciously send out in their foreign policy or communication,which are difficult for the recipient to interpret accurately.Studying the deterrence mechanism of ambiguous signals can provide insights for intelligence signal assessment,deterrence tactics formulation,and international crisis management.[Method]Emplo-ying methods such as archival research and process tracing to analyze the signaling game between U.S.and Soviet decision-makers during the Cuban Missile Crisis can explain how ambiguous signals achieved deterrence.[Result/Conclusion]The deterrence mechanism of am-biguous signals operates as follows:after the deterrer issues ambiguous signals,the target interprets them.From a rational choice perspec-tive,as decision-makers cannot ascertain the specific punishment of deterrence,they find it difficult to be certain that the expected utility of changing the status quo is greater.Consequently,the choice to change the status quo cannot completely outweigh the choice to maintain it.From a decision-making psychology perspective,decision-makers tend to frame the unpunished status quo as a reference point for gains,which induces risk aversion.This leads them to overestimate the severity of potential punishment and fear excessive losses.This psychological bias reinforces the inclination to maintain the status quo,ultimately resulting in a decision to forgo any attempt to change it,thereby enabling the deterrer to achieve success.关键词
模糊信号/威慑机制/信号博弈/决策心理/古巴导弹危机Key words
ambiguous signals/deterrence mechanism/signaling game/decision-making psychology/Cuban missile crisis分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
单清宇..基于古巴导弹危机的模糊信号博弈研究[J].情报杂志,2026,45(4):20-28,48,10.
