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金融大模型赋能中小微企业供应链融资的双重机制与演化博弈研究

吴勇民

工业技术经济2026,Vol.45Issue(4):16-29,14.
工业技术经济2026,Vol.45Issue(4):16-29,14.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2026.04.002

金融大模型赋能中小微企业供应链融资的双重机制与演化博弈研究

On the Dual Mechanisms and Evolutionary Game of Financial Large Models in Empowering Supply Chain Financing for Micro,Small and Medium Enterprises

吴勇民1

作者信息

  • 1. 吉林大学数量经济研究中心,长春 130012||吉林大学商学与管理学院,长春 130012
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Traditional supply chain finance has played an important role in alleviating financing constraints faced by micro,small and medium enterprises(MSMEs).However,it still suffers from excessive reliance on the credit endorsement of core enter⁃prises,limited risk penetration,and weak authenticity verification.As a new generation of generative artificial intelligence technolo⁃gies,financial large models are being rapidly embedded into financial scenarios and have demonstrated substantial potential in multi-source data integration,dynamic credit evaluation,and intelligent decision optimization.Against this backdrop,this paper investigates how financial large models empower supply chain finance for SMMEs.It develops a dual-mechanism analytical frame⁃work from two dimensions:information integration and the reconstruction of the credit evaluation system,and the optimization of fi⁃nancing ecosystem coordination.On this basis,a tripartite evolutionary game model involving financial institutions,SMMEs,and core enterprises is constructed,and MATLAB-based numerical simulations are employed to examine the evolutionary path toward stable equilibrium in the tripartite game.The results show that,in the absence of empowerment by financial large models,the tri⁃partite game system converges to a low-efficiency equilibrium.As the empowerment intensity increases,the system gradually exhib⁃its a tendency to evolve toward a coordinated and mutually beneficial state among the three parties.Once the empowerment intensity exceeds a certain threshold,the system ultimately reaches a high-efficiency evolutionary stable equilibrium.Further analysis indi⁃cates that empowerment intensity,credit evaluation accuracy,and coordination efficiency are the key factors shaping the evolutio⁃nary direction of the tripartite game system.The findings extend the theoretical framework of digital technology-enabled supply chain finance and provide practical references for promoting the application of financial large models in supply chain finance,implementing digital finance policies,and easing financing constraints for SMMEs.

关键词

人工智能/金融大模型/中小微企业/供应链融资/演化博弈/仿真分析/融资约束/金融机构

Key words

artificial lntelligence/financial large models/Micro,Small and Medium Enterprises(MSMEs)/supply chain finance/evolutionary game theory/simulation analysis/financing constraints/financial institutions

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

吴勇民..金融大模型赋能中小微企业供应链融资的双重机制与演化博弈研究[J].工业技术经济,2026,45(4):16-29,14.

基金项目

国家社会科学基金项目"智慧供应链金融赋能实体经济高质量发展的理论机制与实现路径研究"(项目编号:24BJL109). (项目编号:24BJL109)

工业技术经济

OACHSSCD

1004-910X

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