重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）2026，Vol.43Issue(2)：22-35,14.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-0598.2026.02.003
政府购买下机构养老服务质量管治的博弈分析
Game Analysis of Quality Governance in Government-Purchased Institutional Elderly Care Services
摘要
Abstract
Information asymmetry exists in the quality governance in institutional elderly care services.To address this issue,this study constructs a tripartite game model involving institutional elderly care service providers,local government departments,and higher-level governments under the framework of government-purchased institutional elderly care services.The model conducts an in-depth analysis of the key factors influencing the behavioral strategies of these three stakeholders,aiming to address the governance challenges related to the quality of inclusive institutional elderly care services.The findings indicate that the strictness of quality governance by service providers,local governments,and higher-level governments largely depends on their respective governance efforts,governance costs,and the opportunity costs associated with governance.To safeguard the rights of the elderly in accessing quality care services,the government should efficiently fulfill its regulatory responsibilities,mitigate information asymmetry,and improve relevant governance systems and measures,thereby establishing a multi-stakeholder quality governance system for inclusive institutional elderly care services.关键词
政府购买机构养老服务/服务质量管治/信息不对称/多方参与Key words
government-purchased institutional elderly care service/service quality governance/information asymmetry/multi-stakeholder participation分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
夏涛..政府购买下机构养老服务质量管治的博弈分析[J].重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）,2026,43(2):22-35,14.基金项目
重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究项目(24SKGH141)"基于需求层次视角的重庆市社区居家养老服务研究" （24SKGH141）
国家自然科学基金项目(70907080)"管理蜜罐理论探索与仿真实践" （70907080）
