当代经济科学2026，Vol.48Issue(2)：28-42,15.DOI:10.20069/j.cnki.DJKX.2026023
差异化研发补贴政策研究:培育行业冠军抑或促进市场竞争
A Study of Differential R&D Subsidy Policy:To Nurture Industrial Champions or to Promote Market Competition?
摘要
Abstract
Technological innovation is a core driver of economic growth.In order to encourage enterprises to amplify their investments in technological innovation and advance high-quality economic development in China,governments at all levels have implemented a range of R&D support policies.Some local subsidy programs,however,exclusively target or disproportionately benefit large enterprises,characteristic of strength-favoring differential subsidies.The"Fair Competition Review Regulations",promulgated by the State Council on June 13,2024,explicitly incorporate"selective and differential financial incentives or subsidies provided to specific business entities"into the standard clauses affecting"production and operational costs".However,few studies have examined the effects of strength-favoring differential R&D subsidy policies or their optimization from a competition policy perspective.Currently,how to optimize R&D subsidy policies in coordination with competition policy is a critical issue that urgently needs to be addressed by both academia and policymakers. Using a Cournot duopoly model,this paper examines the impact of differential government R&D subsidy policies targeting enterprises of different sizes on market competition and social welfare.The findings reveal that a"strength-favoring"differential subsidy policy,which exclusively subsidizes low-cost enterprises,further exacerbates the competitive disadvantage of other firms.Within certain parameter ranges,the"strength-favoring"differential subsidy policy may reduce total social welfare and suppress competition.Moreover,the smaller the cost gap between subsidized and unsubsidized enterprises,the more likely the subsidy policy is to diminish overall social welfare.When the number of firms in the market exceeds two and the cost gap between subsidized and unsubsidized enterprises remains below a critical threshold Δˉ,within the parameter range where bβ＞k,a strength-favoring differential R&D subsidy policy consistently reduces social welfare.The welfare effects of strength-favoring differential R&D subsidy policies are also influenced by factors such as the government subsidy ratio,the cost structures of subsidized firms,and the number of low-cost enterprises.Furthermore,the study explores the optimal subsidy policy.The results of the analysis of the optimal subsidy show that social welfare maximization requires the government to provide greater subsidies to high-cost enterprises than to low-cost ones.The optimal subsidy policy can narrow the cost gap between low-cost and high-cost enterprises,which will in turn promote market competition and improve resource allocation efficiency.The study underscores that the government should design and optimize R&D subsidy policies based on competition policy principles,with the dual objectives of fostering competition and increasing total social welfare.This research provides theoretical insights for optimizing China's R&D subsidy policies and improving the Fair Competition Review System(FCRS). Compared with previous literature,this paper contributes in the following three aspects:First,this study systematically examines the effects and mechanisms of"strength-favoring"differential R&D subsidy policies on market competition and social welfare from a competition policy perspective,thereby enriching the literature on the evaluation of subsidy policy effectiveness.Second,grounded in competition policy principles,this study proposes an optimal subsidy framework calibrated to firms of different sizes,designed to simultaneously maximize social welfare and foster competitive dynamics.This framework provides theoretical insights for the Chinese government to scientifically design R&D subsidy policies.Third,this study provides theoretical support for the refinement of the FCRS and the enhancement of its practical implementation.Existing literature shows a scarcity of economic and theoretical research on the effectiveness of the FCRS and its enforcement.By investigating the competitive and welfare effects of differential R&D subsidies,this study enhances the understanding of the FCRS and offers theoretical implications for further refinement of both the system and its practical application.关键词
研发补贴政策/竞争政策/公平竞争审查/反竞争效应/企业成本差距/社会福利最大化/资源配置效率Key words
R&D subsidy policy/competition policy/fair competition review/anticompetitive effects/enterprise cost gap/social welfare maximization/resource allocation efficiency引用本文复制引用
林平,张博..差异化研发补贴政策研究:培育行业冠军抑或促进市场竞争[J].当代经济科学,2026,48(2):28-42,15.基金项目
国家自然科学基金重大项目(72192842). （72192842）
