南华大学学报（社会科学版）2025，Vol.26Issue(6)：97-104,8.DOI:10.13967/j.cnki.nhxb.2025.0082
法经济学理念下平台最惠国待遇条款的反垄断规制
Anti-monopoly Regulation of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses from the Perspective of Law and Economics
摘要
Abstract
Platform Most-Favored-Nation(PMFN)clauses have both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.Law and E-conomics,aiming at efficiency,is highly pertinent and its perspective should therefore be introduced into analyses.In Europe and the United States,adjudication and theoretical discussions of typical relevant cases have emphasized an analysis of the competitive effects of the PMFN clauses,thus exhibiting distinct characteristics of Law and Economics.The legal dogmatic analysis of PMFN clauses is sub-ject to disputes over regulatory approaches.However,applying different regulatory approaches to it will lead to a dilemma of inconsis-tent illegality judgments.To overcome this dilemma and prevent the classification of monopolistic behaviors from becoming the decisive factor in the anti-monopoly regulation of PMFN clauses,we should adhere to the perspective of Law and Economics to conduct a con-crete analysis of the competitive effects of different types of PMFN clauses,judge their illegality based on their competitive effects,and evaluate their efficiency performance under the consumer welfare standard,so as to maximize efficiency in China's anti-monopoly regu-lation in the field of platform economy.关键词
平台最惠国待遇条款/法经济学/竞争效应/效率/反垄断规制Key words
Platform Most-Favored-Nation(PMFN)Clauses/Law and Economics/competitive effects/efficiency/anti-monopoly regulation分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
阳建勋,何香韵..法经济学理念下平台最惠国待遇条款的反垄断规制[J].南华大学学报（社会科学版）,2025,26(6):97-104,8.基金项目
福建省社会科学基金重点项目"智能化金融市场系统性风险规制的公私法合作机制研究"资助(编号:FJ2023A012) （编号:FJ2023A012）
