水力发电学报2026，Vol.45Issue(4)：43-58,16.DOI:10.11660/slfdxb.20260404
变速抽蓄参与电能量-调频-爬坡联合市场博弈出清方法
Game-based clearing method for variable-speed pumped storage participating in integrated electricity,frequency regulation,and ramping markets
摘要
Abstract
As a future trend in developing pumped storage,its variable speed operation features fast two-way responses and betters its regulation performance.However,under the current market arrangements,fragmented pricing signals and decoupled bidding decisions across the power markets constrain the revenue potential of a variable-speed pumped storage plant(VSPS).This paper describes a game-based approach for the clearing of a VSPS plant that participates in the coupled electricity-frequency regulation-ramping markets.A Stackelberg bi-level model is formulated,where,at the upper level,the VSPS plant acts as the leader and maximizes its profit by submitting its price-quantity offers to each market,while at the lower level,the joint market operator minimizes the total system operating cost and clears market prices and awarded quantities.The bi-level model is reformulated as a single-level optimization model via the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions,using the McCormick envelopes to linearize the bilinear revenue terms.Case studies show that,in multi-product trading settings,our new approach reduces system operating costs effectively,and reveals and quantifies the flexibility value of VSPS in ancillary services,increasing the plant revenues significantly.关键词
变速抽水蓄能/爬坡市场/Stackelberg模型/Karush-Kuhn-Tucker条件/McCormick包络Key words
variable-speed pumped storage(VSPS)/ramping market/Stackelberg model/Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions/McCormick envelopes分类
信息技术与安全科学引用本文复制引用
李飞,黄康杰,苏凯,严馨玥,李咸善,王秋杰..变速抽蓄参与电能量-调频-爬坡联合市场博弈出清方法[J].水力发电学报,2026,45(4):43-58,16.基金项目
国家自然科学基金(52307109) （52307109）
水资源工程与调度全国重点实验室开放基金(2023SDG02) （2023SDG02）
