太平洋学报2026，Vol.34Issue(3)：17-30,14.DOI:10.14015/j.cnki.1004-8049.2026.03.002
利益宣示与虚张声势:理解印度在中国周边地区的战略行为
Interest Declaration and Bluffing:Understanding Strategic Behavior of India in the Periphery of China
摘要
Abstract
State bluffing refers to the behavior of issuing strong signals to achieve specific objectives.By introducing the concept of"assumed interests"from traditional political science,this article establishes an analytical framework of assumed interests versus valid interests grounded in political theory to examine the motivational sources and existing conditions of state bluffing.Valid interests are those that a state must defend and has invested substantial resources in,whereas assumed interests primarily serve specific strategic objectives.The three relational types constituted by assumed and valid interests correspond to three distinct foreign policies:keeping a low profile,pragmatic diplomacy,and bluffing.Specifically,bluffing occurs when a government rhetorically declares assumed interests as valid interests while lacking actual investment in implementation.Through bluffing,a state converts assumed interests into valid interests without sufficient investment or with no investment at all,thereby achieving its specific strategic intentions.To validate the theoretical framework above,this article selects India's post-2014 behavior in East Asia—a crucial periphery of China—as a case study.India's East Asian diplomacy exhibits distinct characteristics of bluffing.Its motivations lie in enhancing valid interests at lower costs:on one hand,alleviating strategic anxiety arising from damaged valid interests in South Asia;on the other hand,increasing its influence in East Asia at relatively low cost.The environmental conditions enabling India's bluffing include:the Modi government's low domestic audience costs;the absence of international actors exposing or punishing India;and the superficial conformity of its rhetoric with international norms.During the international order transition period,India's intensified alignment with the"Indo-Pacific Strategy"represents an inevitable trend,and bluffing phenomena in international society will become more prevalent.For China,distinguishing other countries'assumed interests from valid interests is crucial.When peripheral states engage in bluffing and opportunistic behaviors,correctly identifying whether these actions erode China's valid interests or are merely opportunistic disturbances under the guise of assumed interests constitutes the prerequisite for proper risk escalation.关键词
虚张声势/国家利益/信号传递/中国周边地区/印度Key words
bluffing/national interests/signal transmission/the periphery of China/India分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
李铭恩..利益宣示与虚张声势:理解印度在中国周边地区的战略行为[J].太平洋学报,2026,34(3):17-30,14.基金项目
本文系清华大学计算社会科学与国家治理实验室重大研究项目"中国海外安全风险预测与预警系统"的阶段性研究成果. （）
