中国人口·资源与环境2026，Vol.36Issue(3)：1-13,13.DOI:10.12062/cpre.20251007
应对气候变化的国际合作最优政策选择
Optimal policy choices for international cooperation on climate change:a comprehensive study based on a global DSGE model and game theory
摘要
Abstract
International cooperation,especially among major economies,is essential for effectively addressing climate change.This study developed a two-sector(green and non-green production sectors)global dynamic stochastic general equilibrium(DSGE)model,in-corporating China,the United States(US),and the European Union(EU).Using macroeconomic and carbon emission data,the study conducted Bayesian estimation and calibration to simulate the impacts of both neutral and green technology shocks on the economic-en-vironmental system.The analysis focused on the transmission mechanisms of demand-side and supply-side adjustments under China's carbon tax policy scenario.Additionally,it employed a tripartite game theory model to explore optimal policy choices under internation-al carbon tax coordination constraints.The findings showed that:① Neutral technology shocks intensified the"growth-emission"dilem-ma by expanding capital in the non-green sector,while green technology shocks overcame carbon lock-in through investment multipli-ers,fostering low-carbon economic growth.② Under China's unilateral carbon tax scenario,China's domestic output contracted.De-mand-side subsidies marginally improved social welfare but led to higher carbon emissions.In contrast,supply-side subsidies enhanced green capacity through bidirectional cost adjustments,though they reduced household welfare across all three economies.However,when combined with green technological innovation,supply-side subsidies could create a win-win scenario,driving both economic growth and emission reductions.③ In the tripartite carbon-tax game,the introduction of demand-side subsidies resulted in an equilibri-um with a carbon tax rate of 9.5%for China,and 11.5%for both the US and the EU,balancing emission reductions and welfare growth.Non-earmarked production subsidies for the green sector induced a"zero-tax-rate"prisoner's dilemma.However,earmarking produc-tion subsidies for green technology innovation fostered a new equilibrium with competitive cooperation(9.5%for China and the US,10.5%for the EU),achieving both output and welfare growth while reducing carbon emissions.Based on these findings,this study rec-ommends:① establishing a differentiated carbon-tax rate coordination mechanism tailored to the distinct realities of green industries in China,the US,and the EU;② optimizing carbon-subsidy allocation by ensuring a fair transition with demand-side subsidies while driv-ing the growth-emission reduction cycle through supply-side subsidies,and ③ shifting international governance towards competitive co-operation—coordinating tax rates in the short term,sharing technologies in the medium term,and constructing a global carbon pricing mechanism in the long term—to achieve a dynamic balance between climate governance and economic growth.关键词
碳税政策/非合作博弈/绿色技术冲击/转移支付机制/DSGE模型Key words
carbon tax policy/non-cooperative game/green technology shock/transfer payment mechanism/DSGE model分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
魏巍贤,王维..应对气候变化的国际合作最优政策选择[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2026,36(3):1-13,13.基金项目
国家社会科学基金重大专项(批准号:22VMG013) （批准号:22VMG013）
对外经贸大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目"以绿色金融和技术创新推动双碳目标实现的路径与政策选择"(批准号:QHZX05) （批准号:QHZX05）
教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目"技术创新实现大气污染治理目标的长效机制及政策选择"(批准号:19JHQ008) （批准号:19JHQ008）
北京市社会科学基金重大项目"京津冀地区生态补偿标准与实施机制研究"(批准号:18ZDA04). （批准号:18ZDA04）
