证券市场导报Issue(4)：38-49,12.
机构投资者持股能否降低企业债务违约风险?
摘要
Abstract
Institutional investors constitute a heterogeneous group,and both theoretical and practical perspectives diverge on whether they provide effective monitoring and optimize governance,or harbor conflicts of interest and exacerbate myopic behavior.Given that institutional investors represent a crucial external governance force with substantial impact on corporate debt default risk,the latter serves as an excellent testbed for examining institutional governance effects.Based on data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen,this study finds that institutional investor ownership significantly reduces corporate debt default risk.This conclusion remains robust after employing treatment effect models and instrumental variable approaches to control for self-selection bias and reverse causality issues.The mechanisms,ranked by importance,are as follows:(1)promoting improvement in information disclosure quality,reducing creditors'monitoring costs and risk assessment uncertainty,thereby diminishing the risk premium demanded by creditors;(2)transmitting positive signals to the market through a"certification effect",increasing accessible funding scale and alleviating financing constraints;and(3)curbing controlling shareholder tunneling,reducing related-party transactions and fund occupation,thereby consolidating debt repayment capacity.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the risk-reducing effect of institutional investors is stronger for firms located in regions with higher financial development levels,belonging to industries with higher default risk,having greater analyst coverage,possessing better board independence,facing higher cash flow risk,and being non-state-owned enterprises.Type-specific analysis reveals that pressure-resistant institutions such as social security funds,securities investment funds,and QFIIs,characterized by strong independence and emphasis on long-term firm value,tend to"vote with their hands"and actively participate in corporate governance.Long-term institutions with extended holding periods and high exit costs have incentives to conduct in-depth research and continuous monitoring,thereby constraining managerial over-leverage and controlling shareholder tunneling.These two institutional types demonstrate more pronounced governance effects on corporate debt default risk compared to pressure-sensitive and short-term institutions,respectively.This study provides empirical evidence for understanding the complexity of institutional investors'governance roles and offers reference value for improving institutional investor regulation and optimizing corporate governance ecosystems.关键词
机构投资者持股/债务违约风险/信息透明度/融资约束/大股东权益侵占Key words
institutional investor ownership/debt default risk/information transparency/financing constraints/controlling shareholder expropriation分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
顾海峰,陈刚瑞..机构投资者持股能否降低企业债务违约风险?[J].证券市场导报,2026,(4):38-49,12.基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"跨境资本流动对商业银行信贷风险的影响机理及政策研究"(批准号:20YJA790014)、东华大学人文社科繁荣计划预研究重大项目"制度型开放背景下跨境资本流动对银行脆弱性的影响机制及治理对策研究"(批准号:2025Z001) （批准号:20YJA790014）
