工业工程2026，Vol.29Issue(2)：78-88,11.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.240345
电商平台奖惩机制下产品合规监管的三方演化博弈研究
Research on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Product Compliance Regulation under the Reward and Punishment Mechanism of E-commerce Platforms
雷涛 1冯苗苗 2谢维3
作者信息
- 1. 数字广东网络建设有限公司,广东 广州 510000
- 2. 华南理工大学 工商管理学院,广东 广州 510645
- 3. 福州大学 经济管理学院,福建 福州 350108
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
To tackle issues such as collusion and rent-seeking between manufacturers and inspectors or third-party testing agencies,as well as insufficient regulation in e-commerce platform sales,this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the platform,inspectors,and manufacturers.By analyzing the influencing factors of the system evolution,the study explores the behavior and evolutionary stable strategies of all parties,with the aim of providing insights for the sustainable and high-quality development of the e-commerce supply chain.Results show that:1)when the e-commerce platform can achieve high net profits from product sales with low government penalties for substandard products,it tends to adopt a lenient regulatory strategy,tolerating manufacturers to produce substandard products and acquiescing in rent-seeking and collusion by inspectors.2)Regardless of the level of regulatory intensity on the e-commerce platform,as long as producing substandard products or accepting rent-seeking yields significant profits,manufacturers and inspectors are inclined to adopt a collusion strategy to pursue short-term gains.Based on these findings,the study proposes feasible recommendations to promote standardized operations within the e-commerce supply chain,offering strategic guidance for the establishment of a robust and sustainable e-commerce ecosystem.关键词
电商/合谋寻租/演化博弈/奖惩机制Key words
e-commerce/rent-seeking/tripartite evolutionary game/reward and punishment mechanism分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
雷涛,冯苗苗,谢维..电商平台奖惩机制下产品合规监管的三方演化博弈研究[J].工业工程,2026,29(2):78-88,11.
