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计及电动汽车聚合的多虚拟电厂主从博弈鲁棒优化

高欣园 王瑞琪 刘松 张存明 李延真 张帅 周卉

电力需求侧管理2026,Vol.28Issue(3):29-35,7.
电力需求侧管理2026,Vol.28Issue(3):29-35,7.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1009-1831.2026.03.005

计及电动汽车聚合的多虚拟电厂主从博弈鲁棒优化

Robust optimization of multi-virtual power plants considering electric vehicle aggregation under a Stackelberg game

高欣园 1王瑞琪 2刘松 1张存明 2李延真 2张帅 2周卉2

作者信息

  • 1. 华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206
  • 2. 国网山东综合能源服务有限公司,济南 250001
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

A bi-level Stackelberg game model is established for coordinated trading among multiple virtual power plants and the dispatch of aggregated electric vehicles.At the upper level,trading prices are optimized to maximize the net profit of the virtual power plant operator.At the lower level,the operating cost of each virtual power plant is minimized by coordinating micro-turbines,energy storage,wind power,inter-ruptible loads and aggregated electric vehicles.Electric vehicles are modeled only as time-varying connected resources in VPP4.Charging and discharging uncertainty is addressed by robust optimization,and the bi-level model is solved by Bayesian optimization.Case studies show that electric vehicle aggregation improves local flexibility,dynamic pricing promotes inter-VPP trading,and robust optimization en-hances dispatch stability.

关键词

虚拟电厂/电动汽车聚合/Stackelberg博弈/鲁棒优化

Key words

virtual power plant/electric vehicle aggregation/Stackelberg game/robust optimization

分类

信息技术与安全科学

引用本文复制引用

高欣园,王瑞琪,刘松,张存明,李延真,张帅,周卉..计及电动汽车聚合的多虚拟电厂主从博弈鲁棒优化[J].电力需求侧管理,2026,28(3):29-35,7.

基金项目

国家自然科学基金(62133008) (62133008)

泰山产业领军人才工程资助(NO.tscx202312127) (NO.tscx202312127)

国网公司总部科技项目(5100-202116567A-0-5-SF) (5100-202116567A-0-5-SF)

电力需求侧管理

1009-1831

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